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Meskil, Andrew. M A., May 2002 History
Standing at a Precipice: Bison Survival and Decline on the Nineteenth Century 
Northern Plains
Director: Dan Flores
Nineteenth century bison decline did not happen for any one reason, nor did it occur • 
along an identical timeline for all regions of the Plains. A host of human and 
environmental factors combined to bump bison out of the ecological niche the animal 
had held for millennia. Theirs is a story of both life and death, destruction and 
preservation. Two questions must be answered in order to understand the history 
of bison on the Northern Plains: 1 )what led to the almost complete decimation of 
bison by 1883? and 2) with so many forces arrayed against the animal, how did 
bison survive for as long as they did? In attempting to answer these questions, I 
have explored five interrelated factors affecting bison: the fur trade, competition from 
domesticated animals, a changing climate and ecology, human disease and warfare. 
Ultimately, bison were almost completely exterminated across the Great Plains, 
however, because of the strict regulation of the Upper Missouri fur trade by the 
American Fur Company prior to the Civil War, less competition from domesticated 
animals, a reduction of Native American population and bison hunting due to 
disease-related population loss, and the protection afforded bison from buffer 
zones, bison survived in significant numbers on the Northern Plains for a decade 
longer than anywhere else in North America.
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introduction
On a recent six-day marathon of a drive from Oregon to the Midwest, I 
lingered for four of those days in the slice of America I like best: the mountains, plains 
and badlands of Montana, Wyoming and the western Dakotas. I found myself 
weaving stories I knew of the region's past into the tapestry of scenery passing 
outside the window. As I left Missoula and sped down Interstate-90 -  passing 
Deer Lodge, Butte, Bozeman -  my mind erased the roads, towns, ranches, and 
cattle and imagined thousands of bison in their place, grazing the shortgrasses of the 
valleys I traveled. I hoped that I’d get to see buffalo before I left what I considered, 
romantically, to be “the West.”’ In Badlands National Park -  w^ere a semi free- 
ranging herd can be found - 1 was greeted by towering, dusk-painted sculptures of 
eroded earth, rising from and descending below an endless sea of emerald green 
prairie grass. Pronghorns and prairie dogs abounded, but I saw no buffalo. A few 
hundred miles further east I consoled myself on the banks of the Missouri river at a 
roadside tourist trap, second only to Wall Drug in faux-western tackiness. I eagerly 
devoured a quarter-pound bison burger while staring at a stuffed buffalo.
This is a fitting image, for bison now occupy a marginal place in North 
America, lying somewhere between a preserved relic of the past and a novel food 
resting between two buns. Although currently there are well over two hundred 
thousand bison living in North America, the vast majority of these are contained within 
private herds, fenced in and raised as a high priced alternative to t>eef, a spectacle 
for tourists, or in some cases as game for wealthy trophy hunters. Even the roughly 
eleven thousand bison on public land, in parks like Yellowstone and Badlands, exist 
in an ecological landscape significantly altered from a century and a half ago.
Although Yellowstone and Wood Buffalo National Park in Canada have wolves and 
grizzly bears that prey on bison, these natural predators are absent in many public 
refuges for buffalo. But this is only one of many problems. In Yellowstone, where
’ While the term “buffalo" actually refers to animals native to Africa and Asia, rather than the 
species Bison bison addressed here, it has long been used interchangeably with “bison” and 
use both in this paper.
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some resident bison are infected with bovine brucellosis -  which impairs the 
reproductive success of afflicted animals -  bison are shot when they leave the park 
out of fear of the disease spreading to surrounding cattle herds. In the Badlands, 
bison are surrounded by perimeter fencing, supported by supplemental water and 
feed, and culled by biologists when the herd’s natural increase exceeds the carrying 
capacity of the park.̂
Despite these problems, it is remarkable that there are any bison left in North 
America at all, let alone in substantial numbers. Just over a century ago there were 
probably no more than three hundred of the animals alive out of the roughly thirty 
million that had ranged the Great Plains two hundred years earlier. How the animal 
came so perilously dose to the brink of extinction is a complex and interesting tale 
that I will explore in the following pages.
I am not treading new ground in this endeavor: the destruction of the American 
bison has captured the attention and intellect of a number of fine scholars, past and 
present. Early works were primarily natural histories of the animal. One of the first to 
take the subject on was the zoologist William T. Hornaday in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. While Hornaday was prone to the ethnocentrism of his day, 
his work remains an important examination of bison decline and figured prominently 
in the animal’s eventual preservation. Half a century later, Frank Gilbert Roe used 
Hornaday to dive far more deeply into the waters of bison history. His book. The 
North American Buffalo, remains a standard in the field. Roe’s and other early works 
have laid a strong foundation built upon by recent scholars utilizing the tools of
 ̂ For two articles critical of bison ranching see Valerius Geist, “Game Ranching: Threat to Wildlife 
Conservation in North America.” Wildlife Society Bulle^n 13 (Winter 1985): 594-600, and “How 
Markets in Wildlife Meat and Parts, and the Sale of Hunting Privileges Jeopardize Wildlife 
Conservation,” Conservation Biology 2 (March 1988): 15-30. Andrew Isenberg provides an 
informative analysis of early efforts at bison conservation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 168-192. A more dated examination of bison conservation 
can be found in Martin S. Garretson, The American Bison: The Story of its Extermination as a Wild 
Species and its Restoration under Federal Protection (New York: New York Zoological Society, 
1938). For a novel solution to modern problems facing bison see Frank J. Popper and Deborah 
E. Popper, “The reinvention of the American Frontier," The Amicus Journal 13 (Summer 1991), 
4-7.
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environmental and ethnohistory.®
One of the most contentious Issues addressed by early scholars being 
revisited by contemporary academics is the role of humans in the devastation of 
bison. More specifically, were Plains Indians major players In the demise of the 
species that was such an Important part of their traditional cultures and livelihood? 
Hornaday answered this question with a resounding yes. This Is not surprising given 
his support for American expansionism and that he was examining the bison’s near- 
extermination through the lenses of Social Darwinism. American Indians made an 
easy scapegoat. Roe took a contrary view. For him, Plains tribes were very much 
in tune with their surrounding environment and did not exceed the limits of their 
resources -  particularly bison. Roe’s view has found favor in recent decades of 
environmentalism and a romantic fascination of many Americans with all things Indian. 
No where Is this more clear than In the “Keep America Beautiful” campaign of the 
1970s. Shepard Krech III points out that In the 1970s the tear filled eyes of the 
Cherokee-ltallan actor Iron Eyes Cody, staring out from the television and poster 
adds of the campaign, Indicted white Americans for polluting the land while Implying 
that Native Americans had kept It pristine. Krech concludes that this Idealized and 
perhaps anachronistic notion of American Indians Ignores a far more complicated 
relationship that tribes had with the land and the flora and fauna that shared It with 
them.*
At about the time the environmental heartstrings of Americans were being 
plucked by the weeping Cody, cultural anthropologist Preston Holder mildly 
accused mid-twentleth century anthropologists of having “glorified” the bison hunting 
lifestyle of Plains Indians. Holder contended that in reality Plains nomads lived In a
 ̂William T. Hornaday, The Extermination of the American Bison, with a Sketch of its Discovery and 
Life H/story (Washington, D.C.; Smithsonian Institution, 1987, reprint of 1889 edition); Frank 
Gilbert Roe, The North American Buffalo: A Critical Study of the Species In Its Wild State 
(Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1951). Another early biological treatment of bison can be 
found in Joel A. Allen, The American Bisons, Living arxi Extinct {Cavnbûdge: Harvard University 
Press, 1876). More recent natural histories include Jerry N. McDonald, North American Bison: 
Their Classification and Evolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), and Tom 
McHugh, The Time of the Buf/a/o (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972).
* Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1999).
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“dynamically imbalanced situation.”® In the past decade environmental historians, and 
a handful of scholars from other disciplines, have tested Holder’s view by taking a 
much closer look at Plains Indians and the environmental consequences of their 
nomadic lifestyle. On the Southern Plains, Dan Flores has concluded that Indians 
there contributed to the decline of southern herds, through their hunting, the 
competition of their horses with bison for forage, and their supernatural beliefs 
surrounding the animal. In a larger work questioning contemporary notions of Indians 
as ecologists, Shepard Krech III has explored and largely supported the findings of 
Flores for the Great Plains in general. Analyzing American settlement and Indian 
responses on the Central Plains, Elliot West has arrived at many of the same 
conclusions: in the face of a changing economic, environmental, and demographic 
world, tribes were forced to make accommodations that had damaging 
repercussions on the natural world around them. Examining the extermination of 
bison farther to the north on the Canadian Plains, William Dobak echoes the above 
authors by asserting that for northern tribes “a healthy, functioning ecology” was 
“impossible to achieve.” ®
Native Americans, however, were not living in an isolated bubble, and (by 
the nineteenth century) their actions were tied to the larger ecological, demographic, 
political and economic world enveloping them. Climate change, a growing market 
economy, warfare, politics, and American expansionism were also major players in 
the nineteenth century tragedy of the bison. Although the above authors explore 
these other factors in their regional examinations of the Plains, two books examine in 
more detail the history of bison across the entire Great Plains. The first, by the 
archaeologist Douglass Bamforth, examines the interplay of Indian adaptation and 
ecology on the Great Plains from the Pleistocene to the nineteenth century.
® Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the Plains: A Study of Cultural Development among 
North American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 110-11.
® Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy,” Journal of American History, 78 (September 
1991), 465-485 ; Krech III, The Ecological Indian, 123-149; Andrew Isenberg, The Destruction of 
the Bison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Elliot West, The Contested 
Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, & the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1998); William A. Dobak, “Kiliing the Canadian Buffalo, 1831-1881," Western Historical Quarterly 
27 (Spring 1996), 33-52.
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ecology on the Great Plains from the Pleistocene to the nineteenth century. 
Banforth’s study, however, lacks an examination of nineteenth century ecological 
change In the region wrought by Euroamericans. Another work, by historian Andrew 
Isenberg, traces the “destruction of the bison” from the eighteenth century through 
the early twentieth century. Isenberg’s book reflects the more holistic approach -  
examining social, ideological, political, economic, and environmental factors -  of 
Flores, Krech, West, and Dobak, but it encompasses all of the Plains for the period 
after 1750. For a broad scale ethnohistorical, environmental, and gendered portrait 
of bison decline on the Great Plains, Isenberg's book is an achievement.^
However, the tremendous geographic and temporal scope of the work has led 
Isenberg to at least partially overlook, for the sake of regional continuity, the unique 
cultural, environmental, and historical landscapes of the various subregions of the 
Plains.
The Northern Plains extend from the Rocky Mountains of Montana north to 
the open grasslands and hills of Alberta and Saskatchewan, stretching 
southeastward to the Missouri river and back again west to central Wyoming. I 
chose this strikingly diverse and beautiful country as the setting for my study in part 
because it has received the least attention from recent scholars taking a revisionist 
approach to bison history. While Isenberg and Krech cover the destruction of 
northem bison, their conclusions for northern grasslands are based primarily on 
findings for the Central and Southern Plains. Dobak’s work, on the other hand, is 
centered on the Canadian Plains and largely excludes the Northern Plains below the 
49th parallel. The latter region holds a social, cultural, environmental, and political 
history of bison diminution that is decidedly unique. While many of my findings 
resemble those found by scholars addressing the history of humans and bison in 
other parts of the Plains, there are important distinctions between the section of the 
Northem Plains I examine and other areas.
Dan Flores has recognized these distinctions with a more in depth analysis of 
people and buffalo on the Northern Plains. However, his work on the topic functions
 ̂Douglass Bamforth, Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1988): Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison.
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more as an introduction to, rather than an exhaustive treatment of, the topic. 
Nevertheless, I have been greatly influenced by it, as well as by his analysis of the 
Southern Plains. Flores has identified friree points central to the historical 
reinterpretation of Indian and Bison on the Northem Plains:
1. “How many Indians hunted bison, and what factors affected their bison kill?"
2. “What other factors, both long-term and short-term, might have affected 
bison populations?”
3. “Did Plains Indian world views function, as we have often been told, to 
give native peoples special insights into how nature worked, and to keep Indians in 
harmonious balance with the natural world? Or were there other forces afoot in the 
West by the nineteenth century that influenced the Indian relationship to nature in 
even more compelling ways?”®
In my analysis of the Northern Plains I have tried to expand on the findings of 
Flores and others on these points, noting the continuity and contrast between this 
area and other subregions of the Plains. Overall, two central questions drive my 
endeavor. The first: why were bison nearly annihilated in the nineteenth century? In 
this, I am very much following the models of scholars noted above. This has 
allowed me to test the conclusions of others against my own findings, while offering a 
point of comparison for histories of people and buffalo in other parts of the West.
The second question is somewhat paradoxical to the first: why did bison, with 
so many forces arrayed against them, live in sizable numbers for as long as they did 
on the Northern Plains? So much academic attention has gone into figuring out what 
factors nearly destroyed buffalo that we have ignored the incredible viability of the 
animal in at least some corners of North America. While this inquiry could be directed 
toward any sub-region of the Plains, it is particularly relevant to the American 
Northern Plains, which harbored substantial numbers of bison a decade after their 
slaughter elsewhere in the West.
These two questions cannot be separated, nor should they be. The
• Dan Flores, “The Great Contraction: Bison and Indians in Northern Plains Environmental History,” 
Legacy: New Perspectives on the BatUe of the Littie Bighorn (Helena: Montana Historical Society 
Press, 1996), 5.
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nineteenth century history of northern bison is a tale of both life and death, destruction 
and preservation. In attempting to identify why this was the case, I have explored 
five factors that impacted bison in different ways: the American Fur Company, 
competition from domestic animals, a changing climate and ecology, human disease, 
and warfare.
Ultimately, the historic interplay of humans and bison (whether from the 
standpoint of the animal’s decline or survival) on the Great Plains makes for a 
complicated story with numerous characters and plots. Out of necessity this is an 
abridged version. I have included what I consider to be the most relevant factors 
relating to the history of bison and people in the nineteenth century. Rightly or 
wrongly, there are many more that I have ignored. In focusing on the Northem 
Plains, specifically the section of it lying within the United States, I offer a case study 
that can be compared and contrasted with like-histories of the Central and Southern 
Plains for a more œmplete understanding of the interior West. In the end I have 
raised more questions than answers and hope that this study will lead to further 
inquiry into the historic interactions between people and environment on the Northern 
Plains.
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Chapter One:
“A Market was Furnished for His Robe " : The Effects of the Fur Trade on
Northern Bison
For years white hide hunters bore the lion’s share of blame in the near 
extirpation of the bison. More recently, however, the burden’s been spread by 
contemporary scholars. Current research notes that buffalo were moving toward 
near-extinction earlier than the large scale hide hunt of the latter nineteenth century. 
Still, the economic motivations that drove white hide hunters to kill bison on a 
massive scale in the 1870s and 1880s were the same incentives that encouraged 
many western tribes by the 1830s to kill more buffalo than were needed for 
subsistence. The nineteenth century market economy, then, remains an important 
factor in the dramatic reduction of the bison’s population and range throughout the 
nineteenth century and offers an excellent point of departure for the story of the 
destruction of bison on the nineteenth century Northern Plains.
In the early years of the western fur trade, little value was placed on buffalo 
products. Instead, the market’s attention was centered on the beaver and the 
importance of its underhair to the making of hats popular in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Although Native Americans did hunt the beaver for exchange at 
Anglo trading posts, Euroamericans were the major producers and entrepreneurs of 
the western version of the beaver trade (beaver were cleared from the East 
primarily by Indian procurers). The geographer David Wisart has characterized this 
production method as the “Rocky Mountain Trapping System ”. This system, with 
the technological help of steel traps, was incredibly successful throughout much of 
the West -  thousands of beaver pelts were taken by mountain men, and Indian 
hunters, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.^
 ̂ Henry Macdonald, “Game and Hunters," We Seized Our Rifles: Recollections of the Montana 
Fronfter (Missoula: Mountain Press Publishing Co., 1982), 141.
 ̂J.L. Clayton, “The Growth and Significance of the American Fur Trade”, Aspects of the Fur 
Trade: Selected Papers of the 1965 North American Fur Trade Conference (St Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society, 1967) 62-72; David J. Wishart, The Fur Trade oftiie American West. 1807- 
1840: A Geographical Synthesis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 27, 31.
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By the late 1820s beaver populations across the West were declining as a 
result of intensive hunting. On the Snake river plains the famed trapper Peter Skene 
Ogden and his brigade, following the policy of Governor George Simpson of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, nearly trapped the country bare in an effort to keep 
American fur men out of the region. Subsequently, some of the more daring 
trappers turned their attention to the beaver-rich lands of the Blackfeet and Crow 
Indians. The abundance of wildlife along the waterways in present day Montana and 
northem Wyoming was due in part to the animosity of the Blackfeet to American 
trappers, who effectively kept the latter from entering the region following the Lewis 
and Clark expedition (1803-1806). Much has been made of Meriwether Lewis’s 
fight with Blackfeet warriors in 1806 and the event’s importance in fostering the tribe’s 
long-standing aversion to Americans. Probably the better reason for the Blackfeet’s 
anti-American attitude is their sensible dislike of Americans trapping beaver on 
Blackfeet hunting grounds, rather than relying on Blackfeet hunters to trade beaver 
pelts, which bypassed the tribe’s pecuniary interests altogether. The British were 
not allowed to trap legally below the 49th parallel east of the Rockies and, much to 
the tribe’s liking and economic benefit, relied on Blackfeet hunters to funnel furs from 
the area to British trading posts. Although a few daring fur expeditions (most 
notably those of Manuel Lisa) tried to penetrate the Upper Missouri in the early 
years of the nineteenth century, it was not until 1829 that American trappers 
successfully entered the area and began reaping the rewards of the lucrative 
trapping and trade it held. Within a year, large brigades of mountain men were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
setting their traps, alt>eit with considerable risk, in the Blackfeet hunting grounds/
By the mid-thirties even the rich Upper Missouri and Yellowstone beaver 
country was showing signs of depletion and St. Louis-based fur companies (the 
American Fur Company being the most important of these until the Civil War) 
became increasingly dependent on another animal for profit: buffalo. The emphasis 
on the latter animal also brought with it a different, and perhaps more normal, 
procurement system based on trade and a reliance on Native Americans as the 
primary producers. This was far more acceptable to Upper Missouri tribes, the 
Blackfeet included, and they soon became active in the trade in buffalo products.
The 1832 arrival of an American Fur Company steamboat, with its high-volume 
carrying capacity, at the mouth of the Yellowstone made it even more convenient to 
transport bison robes to St. Louis. The shift in importance from beaver to bison in 
the fur trade was made complete in 1834, when the market for the former animal 
crashed. By actively market hunting the buffalo, Xribes unconsciously were taking a 
course far more dangerous to their livelihood than when they hunted the beaver. 
Unlike beaver, buffalo were central to the nutritional and cultural survival of traditional 
tribal life on the plains. When b>eavers became scarce tribes lost a commodity for 
trade. When bison became scarce Plains tribes lost a way of life.̂
Nevertheless, even before the beaver lost its elevated status in the Western
® Ibid., 29; F. Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire: George Simpson's Journal, 1824-1825 
{Cambridge: Belnap Press, 1968), 46; Peter Skene Ogden, “The Peter Skene Ogden Journals," 
Oregon Historical Quarterly 11 {December, 1910), 355-379; John C.Ewers, “Indian Views of the 
White Man Prior to 1850” and ‘The Influence of the Fur Trade upon the Indians of the Northern 
Plains,” Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change {Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 32-33, 42. For other more specific accounts of the early fur trade see: 
John Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America in the Years 1809, 1810, and 1811 {Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986); Hiram M. Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far 
West {New York: Barnes and Noble, 1935); Leroy R. Hafen, Broken Hand, The Life of Thomas 
Frederick: l\/lountain Man, Guide and Indian Agent {Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 
1931); John C. Jackson, Shadow on the Tetons: David E. Jackson and tfie Claiming of the 
American West {Missoula: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1993); John C. Luttig, Joumal of 
a Fur-Trading Expedition on the Upper Missouri, 1812-1813 (St. Louis: Missouri Historical 
Society, 1920); Dale L. Morgan, Jedediah Smith and the Opening of the West {New York: Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, 1953); John E. Sunder, BUI Sublette, Mountain Man {Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1959).
' Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 30-33; Louis Hunter, Steamboats on the Western 
Rivers: An Economic and TecJinologicai History {Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 
47-49.
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market economy, buffalo played some role in the trade. Although elk, deer, 
antelope and other wildlife were sources of food for Euroamerican trappers and 
traders (and, of course, western tribes) in their quest for pelts, buffalo provided the 
favored fare for these men and their families. In some places this use of buffalo 
merely for subsistence could be devastating to the animal. According to the 
renowned trapper and later Indian agent Thomas Fitzpatrick, buffalo once ranged into 
many Rocky Mountain valleys in “immense numbers."^ The trapper John Work told 
of significant numbers of buffalo in the mountains of present-day Idaho in his travels 
of 1831 and 1832.® By 1839, according to one observer, there was an increasing 
scarcity of bison in the mountains, likely as a result of over-hunting by white trappers. 
Although it was the beaver that mountain men were after in the early fur trade, it was 
the meat of the buffalo that sustained them. Apparently this Euroamerican hunting 
pressure, added to that of tribes in the area, was enough to drive bison out of the 
mountains altogether after 1840. Although buffalo roamed the Rockies in far fewer 
numbers than in the plains to the east, their decline in the former range offers a telling 
example of the impact of human hunting of the animal merely as a food source.^
Buffalo products dominated the fur trade by the mid-1830s, but the economic 
importance of the animal dates back at least twenty years before. As early as 1815 
buffalo robes were being sent down the Missouri in significant numbers. Between 
that year and 1834 an annual average of 25,000 robes were coming down the river.® 
The establishment of pivotal trading posts along the Missouri and neighboring 
waterways at the tail end of this period expedited the collection and transport of
® Donald Jackson and Mary Lee Spence, eds., The Expeditions of John Charles Fremont, Vol. 1 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 490-1.
® The Journal of John Work: A Chief-Trader of the Hudson’s Bay Co. During His Expedition from 
Vancouver to the FlaUreads and Blackfeet of the Pacific Northwest (Cleveland; The Arthur H. 
Clark Company, 1923), 98-109.
' Wishart, The Fur Trade of dw American West, 34-35. Thomas J. Farnham, “Travels in the Great 
Western Prairies, 1839," Early Westem Travels, Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed., Vol. 28 and Vol. 29 
(Cleveland, 1906), 233-41. See also Richard Irving Dodge, The trains of the Great West and 
Their Inhabitants Being a Description of the Plains. Game, Indians, & c. of the Great North 
American Desert (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1877), 144.
* “Report of Thomas J. Dougherty, Indian Agent at Upper Missouri Agency, Oct. 25,1831," 
Senate Documents, 22 Cong. 1 sess. vol. 2. no. 90, 53, quoted in Merrill G. Burlingame, “The 
Buffalo in Trade and Commerce,” North Dakota Histcxical Quarterly 3 (July, 1929), 266.
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robes and other peltries. Among the more important of these: Fort Union was built 
in 1829 at the mouth of the Yellowstone; Fort Clark became a more permanent post 
among the Mandan and Hidatsa villages in 1831 ; Fort Pierre was established near 
the mouth of the Teton river in 1832; and in 1834 Fort Laramie became a prominent 
post on the North Platte river. Perhaps one of the most significant breakthroughs for 
the American Fur Company came in 1831, with the establishment of Fort Piegan at 
the mouth of the Marias river. This latter post, to be replaced three years later and 
six miles away by Fort Mackenzie, enabled the company to tap, at long last, the 
valuable Blackfeet trade on a large scale. Another post, Fort Cass, was built on the 
Yellowstone at the behest of the Crows in 1834, but constant intertribal warfare in 
the area made it a position difficult to maintain. After reaching Fort Union in 1832, 
steamboats became the vital ttiread that tied these far flung northern posts together 
for much of the next half century.®
Beginning in 1835 the expanded presence of the fur trade, dominated by 
the American Fur Company, paid off. From this year through 1845 the average 
number of robes shipped annually to St. Louis was 90,000.^° The number of robes 
traded in the second half of the 1840s, however, is more difficult to gage. Father 
Pierre-Jean De Smet reported that by 1847,110,000 robes were being shipped 
to St. Louis.” This number contrasted sharply with that of figures given in Hunt’s 
Merchant’s Magazine, stating that an average of only 30,850 robes arrived in St.
Louis between 1845-1853.^^ Sources examined by John E. Sunder have led him
* Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American Wesf, 53-60. For a detailed account of the 
establishment of Fort Piegan, later Fort Mackenzie, see James H. Bradley. “Affairs at Fort Benton 
From 1831 to 1869,” Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, vol. Ill (Boston: J. S. 
Canner and Company Inc., 1966) (a reprint of the original 1900 edition), 201-206.
Merrill G. Burlingame, T h e  Buffalo in Trade and Commerce,” 277. The number was likely as 
much as 20,000 less for 1842 and 1843 because Fort Mackenzie, and the valuable trade it 
brought, was abandoned in these years due to the slaughter of a large party of Blackfeet by the 
traders Alexander Harvey and Francis Chardon in 1842. The tribe was understandably incensed 
and trading bonds were not reestablished until Alexander Culbertson returned to the Upper 
Missouri in 1844. See Bradley, “Affairs at Fort Benton," 236-239.
” Pierre Jean De Smet, Life, Letters, and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean De Smet, S. J., 1801- 
1873, Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed.. Vol. 2 (New York: Harper, 1905), 635-36. According to 
Lieutenant James Bradley, 1847 was “...one of the most prosperous seasons in respect to trade 
ever witnessed at the upper fort [Benton]," with over 20,000 robes traded. See Bradley, “Affairs 
at Fort Benton." 257.
"  Budingame, T h e  Buffalo in Trade and Commerce," 277.
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to conclude that the “St. Louis market averaged 90,000 per year during the 1840’s 
and 100,000 during the fifties and sixties.’”  ̂ Andrew Isenberg accepts De Smet’s 
estimate, finding a report by the Indian agent William S. Hatten that also gives
110,000 as the number of robes shipped.’'̂
Even given the difficulties posed by often contradictory sources, most 
records indicate that the northern robe traffic declined, with two exceptional years, for 
more than a decade following 1849. Historian Merrill Burlingame has found that only 
11,023 robes were received in the latter year; 67,654 in 1850; 95,844 in 1851 ; and 
59,441 in 1852.̂ ® Isenberg, examining American Fur Company records, 
discovered that in 1853 the company collected 88,927 bison robes.’® Alfred 
Vaughn, Indian agent for the Blackfeet, took into account opposition and American 
Fur Company returns and put the number for the year at “[njot less than 100,000. 
Although I have not found robe shipment figures for 1854 and 1855, the statement 
of profit shares for individual American Fur Company employees for the latter year 
are a fourth of what they were in 1853, which indicates a relatively meager year for 
the robe trade. The year 1856 also continued poorly with only 34,243 robes being 
purchased by the American Fur Company.’® Business picked up, but was still 
below earlier levels, in 1857 with approximately 75,000 robes coming down the 
river.’® By 1859, the trade had again slowed to 50,000 robes a year.*
One factor that may have contributed to the ebb and flow in this decade-long 
record of robe returns is climate. Richmond Clow has questioned the doomsday
" John E. Sunder, The Fur Trade on the Upper Missouri, 1840-1865 (Norman; University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1965), 17.
Andrew Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 106; William S. Hatten, Annual Report of the 
Office of Indian Affairs, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 1849, S. exdoc. 1 (Serial 550), 1074.
Merrill G. Burlingame, The Economic Importance of the Buffalo in the Northern Plains Region, 
1800-1890, masters thesis (University of Iowa, 1928), 149. Joel A. Allen gives a figure of 
100,000 robes shipped in 1850. See American Bisons, Living and Exftncf (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1876), 186.
’* lsent>erg, The Destruction of tiie Bison, 106.
Alfred Vaughn, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1853, H. 
exdoc. 1, (Serial 710), 354-55.
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. 10 (Helena: Naegele Printing Co., 
1940), 232,234-35.
"  Joel A. Allen, The American Bisons, Living and Extinct, 188.
“  Isenberg, The Destruction of tiie Bison, 106.
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accounts of some contemporary scholars regarding over hunting by Plains Indians in 
the nineteenth century. Clow points out that bison scarcity, particularly in the 1830s, 
was linked more to weather patterns than Indian arrows. Clow and others have 
found a wealth of primary evidence demonstrating that during harsh winters bison 
sought shelter in grassland riparian zones -  places where people could easily hunt 
them. Conversely, mild winters kept bison on the open Plains, away from Indian 
hunters.^’ The apparently poor robe returns of 1855, then, might have been due in 
part to the mild winter of 1854-1855, when, according to one account, ‘the buffalo 
herds avoided the river valleys...”̂
Regardless of the reasons behind periodic fluctuations in the numbers of 
robes sent down river to St. Louis, from the mid-1830s on Upper Missouri tribes 
were killing far more buffalo for market than they did in the days before the 
inducements of Western trade. This was not lost on nineteenth century observers. 
Lieutenant James H. Bradley, a perceptive student of frontier history who died 
fighting the Nez Perce in the Battle of the Big Hole, wrote of the Blackfeet;
“[fjormerly they had accumulated no more buffalo robes than was necessary for their 
own use; but now that a market for them was created within their reach they began 
their manufacture on a more extensive scale.” This scale reached as much as 21,000 
annually for the tribe by the 1840s. An old Crow informant told Bradley in 1876 that 
before traders came to his people, the Crows “never dressed more robes than 
they needed for themselves, but this winter [probably 1833] they went to Wind 
river, where the buffalo were plenty, and killed a good many, and dressed all the 
robes, so that every lodge had from sixteen to eighteen robes to sell to the trader.” 
The Crows, with a much smaller population than the Blackfeet, traded approximately
Richmond Clow, "Bison Ecology, Brule and Yankton Winter Hunting and the Starving Winter of
1832-33,” Great Plains Ouarter/y 15 (Fall 1995), 259. For discussion of bison movements in 
response to climate change, see also Frank Gilbert Roe, The North American Buffalo: A Critical 
Study of the Species in its Wild State (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1970, 
2nd ed.). 84-85; Dewy J. Soper, “History, Range and Home Life of the Northern Bison,” 
Ecological Monographs M  (1941), 384; John R. Bozell, “Cultural, Environment, and Bison 
Populations on the Late Prehistoric and Early Historic Central Plains,” Plains Anthropologist 40 
(May 1995), 159.
“  Quoted in Clow, “Bison Ecology,” 268.
14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5,000 robes annually Henry Macdonald, who was at various times following the 
Civil War a trapper, trader, guide, pony express rider, and rancher, also 
emphasized the significance of trade in Indian bison hunting: “[wjhen the Indian 
merely killed buffalo for food and clotties these animals were probably on the 
increase in spite of the forces arrayed against them. But when the trader came and 
dangled before the longing eyes of the savage glittering trumpery gewgaws, a 
market was furnished for his robe and the fate of the buffalo was sealed.”̂
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a number of Indian agents 
recognized, in often condemning terms, the effect the fur trade was having on Indian 
predation of buffalo. In his 1849 report. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando 
Brown blamed the trading practices of the Hudson’s Bay Company for 
“...destroying, annually, immense quantities of buffalo and other game on our side of 
the line, for their own purposes and those of the company, which gives great 
dissatisfaction to our Indians, and must eventually prove of serious injury to them, by 
the extermination, in a few years, of this their chief source of subsistence.”^ Luke 
Lea, who followed Brown as Commissioner, made a similar accusation a year later, 
again blaming the trade of the Hudson’s Bay Company for “...the immense annual 
destruction of the buffalo.”*  Alfred Vaughn complained that buffalo were fast 
declining as a result of the “...improvident and reckless course pursued by the 
Indians in destroying them In a report of 1858, Vaughn said that the buffalo were 
“...followed and ruthlessly slaughtered that its furred robe may demand its price from
“  Bradley, “Affairs at Fort Benton," 203, 263; Bradley, “Journal of James H. Bradley,” 
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, vol. II (Boston: J. S. Canner and Company Inc., 
1966), 181, 200.
Henry Macdonald, “Game and Hunters,” We Seized Our Rifles: Recollections of the Montana 
Frontier {Missoula: Mountain Press Publishing Co., 1982), 141.
Orlando Brown. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 31st Cong., 1 st Sess., 
1849, H. exdoc. 5,951. This comment was undoubtedly more of a nationalistic attack on the 
Hudson’s Bay Company than a fair appraisal of the fur trade, and should lie viewed with this in 
mind. If Brown had wanted to be a bit more even handed he would have acknowledged that the 
buffalo robe trade of the American Fur Company was often four times that of the Canadian-based 
company.
“  Luke Lea, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1850, 
H. exdoc. 1, (Serial 595), 37.
Alfred J. Vaughn, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 33rd Cong., 1 st Sess., 1854, H. 
exdoc. 1, (Serial 710), 354.
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the trader. Were these Inducements for its speedy extermination withdrawn -  this
price upon its scalp no longer offered the buffalo would again increase till it filled the
valley and the plain...” He then noted:
when a sufficiency for the absolute want of the lodge and the prairie 
demanded its destruction, its increase was coequal with the necessities 
of the red man; but when the cupidity of the whites forged the iron 
arrow point, and the passion of the Indian was stimulated to draw the 
bow, myriads of buffalo were recklessly sacrificed for the gain of the 
one and the pleasure of ttie other.®
E. A. C. Hatch, Vaughn’s replacement as the Blackfeet agent, concurred with his 
predecessor by saying that the Blackfeet “...annually destroy much more game than 
they require to subsist and clothe themselves, but as there is yet no sensible 
decrease in the number of buffalo in their country, it is impossible, at present, to 
induce them to become more economical.”® In 1858 Charles E. Mix, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, went as far as recommending that “(m]easures 
should be adopted to prevent the annual slaughter of the Buffalo...merely for their 
skins to sell to the traders.”®
However, focusing on the fur trade, and traders, purely as agents for the 
bison’s destruction is to ignore the complex role that the American Fur Company 
played in manipulating bison ecology on the Northern Plains in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. For almost forty years, beginning in 1827, the Upper Missouri 
outfit of the American Fur Company -  first under the guidance of Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
and later under his son Charles -  had a periodically contested but powerful 
monopoly of the Upper Missouri trade. The effects of this monopoly on the 
people, wildlife, and environment of the Upper Missouri country were substantial. 
The sizable trade in buffalo products controlled by the company certainly had a 
debilitating effect on the overall bison population of the Northern and Central Plains. 
Whether or not the early trade in robes, and to a lesser extent tongues and
pemmican. prior to the intensive hide hunt of the early 1880s would have led to the
“  Vaughn, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1859, H. exdoc. 
2, (Serial 997), 434-35.
“  E.A.C. Hatch, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 1856, H. 
exdoc. 1, (Serial 840), 627
^ Charles E. Mix, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1858, H. exdoc. 2, (Serial 997), 364.
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extinction of the animal Is more open to debate. The historical record shows a bison 
range and population that was shrinking throughout the nineteenth century, and the 
robe trade undoubtedly played a role in this proœss. Still, the annual volume of the 
robe trade was far less than the trade in hides that followed it, and no doubt the 
buffalo would not have vanished so early, suddenly, and completely had the trade 
remained exclusively that of the animal's pelt procured and processed by the tribes.
By way of its monopoly, the American Fur Company functioned somewhat 
as a regulatory entity for Northern Plains commerce and a limiting factor on the trade in 
buffalo products. The latter point can seem problematic given the company’s 
inherently exploitative and profit-motivated use of western wildlife. Yet the fact that 
the American Fur Company was able to nullify competition effectively resulted in 
fewer robes being processed and traded by Native Americans than otherwise 
might have occurred. It was in the company’s interest not to flood the market. If a 
lasting opposition had established itself in the Upper Missouri trade during the forty 
years of American Fur Company domination, it likely would have benefited the 
tribes by raising the value of robes and other peltries. As a result, an incentive for 
plains tribes to kill more buffalo for robes, to capitalize on improved rates of 
exchange, might have resulted.
Andrew Isenberg has rightly pointed out that the American Fur Company, 
having learned from the crash in the beaver pelt market in the 1830s, intentionally 
fixed a low price on bison robes to discourage saturating the market. He argues that 
the company was able to garner a profit selling robes at a “moderate” price due to 
the high volume of the commodity being shipped east. According to Isenberg this 
marketing scheme “meant heavy pressure on the herds. ” Perhaps, but the paltry 
price of robes sold to eastern merchants was compensated for not only by high 
volume shipments, but also by the ridiculously low prices paid in trade goods by 
traders to Indians for their pelts. Euroamerican traders marked up their wares from 80 
to as much as 2000 percent. Indians were not innocent dupes, but lacking any other
17
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trading alternatives most were forced to accept the exorbitant rates of white traders/^ 
An exception to this situation existed on the far Northern Plains for the 
Piegans, Bloods, Blackfeet, Assiniboines, and Crees, who were in a better 
commercial position, geographically, than many tribes given their proximity to the 
49th parallel. These tribes could ply the trade of both the Hudson Bay Company 
north of the line in Canada and the Americans further south, thereby gaining a 
stronger hand in barter. In light of this, it hardly seems coincidental that the tribes of 
the Blackfeet confederacy were among the top suppliers of peltries in the western 
trade, often supplying as many as 20,000 robes annually by the 1840s to Upper 
Missouri posts. By comparison, the Crow, who had a similar population to the 
Blackfeet following the smallpox epidemic in 1837-1838, only traded 5,000 robes 
on average. It seems likely, therefore, that had a stronger opposition fur company 
existed along the Missouri and its Wbutaries, exchange values for furs would have 
increased proportionally to competition among the fur companies. Tribes might 
have capitalized on the more favorable economic situation by killing more buffalo for 
use in trade and reduced bison populations more quickly than actually occurred. One 
might describe the American Fur Company’s monopolistic hand in destroying 
buffalo as “restrained exploitation” when compared to the orgy of destruction 
undertaken by the independent hide hunters of the 1870s and early 1880s.“
Another reason for the American Fur Company’s importance to the northern 
bison range was as a partial barrier to Euroamerican settlement. While the company 
remained powerful it controlled, to a large extent, what and who went upriver from
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 105, 107; Sunder, The Fur Trade on the Upper 
Missouri, 36; Rudolph Friedrich Kurz, Journal of Rudolph Friedrich Kurz: An Account of His 
Experiences Among Fur Traders and American Indians on the Mississippi and the Upper Missouri 
Rivers During the years 1846 to 1652 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 177; Francis 
A. Chardon, Journal At Fort Clark, 7834-1839 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 351.
In 1844 the Union Fur Company and the fur interests of Pratte and Cabanne were vying with the 
American Fur Company for the Upper Missouri Indian trade and the tribes shrewdly took 
advantage of it. Ultimately, the latter company came out on top. See Thomas H. Harvey to T. H. 
Crawford, October 8,1844, 28 Cong., S. exdoc. 1, 438. John C. Ewers discusses the 
importance of fur company competition to border tribes in “The influence of the Fur Trade upon 
the Indians of the Northern Plains,” Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and 
Change (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 52-55. See also Oscar Lewis, ‘The 
Effects of White Contact upon Blackfoot Culture,” Anthropological Essays (New York: Random 
House, 1970), 179-180.
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St. Louis on its steamboats. Further, the limited bureaucracy, In the form of Indian 
agencies, that did exist for the Upper Missouri during the second third of the 
nineteenth century was strongly influenced by the company. In part this was due to 
the political acumen of Pierre Chouteau, Jr., and later by his son Charles, along with 
other partners of the American Fur Company. Indian agents and a number of 
politicians who balked at the political leverage of the company found it exceedingly 
difficult to change the situation. Indian agents depended on trading posts for 
annuities, interpreters, and a host of other services -  not the least of these being 
transportation. Annuities were delivered on the company’s steamboats, for years 
being the only craft on the Missouri that were remotely dependable. An interesting 
consequence of this was that tribes associated -  much to the benefit of the company 
and consternation of Indian agents -  federal gifts and annuities with the American Fur 
Company, rather than the United States government.^
Fur traders were also willing to promote another view first articulated by the 
explorer Stephen Long: that the westem plains were a “Great American Desert" 
unfit for civilized habitation and occupation. It was obvious to traders that with 
Euroamerican settlement came a sharp decline in a region’s wildlife populations. To 
keep the fur trade productive, so-called civilization needed to be kept at bay. 
According to the fur trader W. H. Parkinson, he was requested by John B. Sarpy, a 
partner in the American Fur Company, to say nothing of a gold discovery made 
along the Cannonball river, in present day southern North Dakota, in 1852 because 
“...it would cause an emigration and destroy the fur trade.’’̂
Others accused traders, and the American Fur Company in general, of 
discouraging tribes from becoming “civilized.” The Frontier artist Rudolph Friederich 
Kurz, himself in the employ of the American Fur Company, recorded that “[t]hey [fur
Sunder, The Upper Missouri Fur Trade, 26-30, 49, 78-9, 82,114,149, 157. The fur trader 
Charles Larpenteur, in scathing terms, critiques the influence that the American Fur Company had 
over the Indian Bureau. See Forty Years a Fur Trader on the Upper Missouri: The Personal 
Narrative of Charles Larpenteur, 1833-1872 (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1933), 343-360; 
Samuel N. Latta, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862-1863, 
H. exdoc. 2, (Serial 1157), 341.
^ “Biographical History of W. H. Parkison, " Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. 
4 (Helena: Independent Publishing Company, 1903), 232.
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traders] regard civilization of the Indian with detestation, t>ecause that means the end 
of their traffic.” Going further, he noted that “[a]s long as there are buffaloes to kill fur 
traders are going to take a resolute stand against the civilization of Indians.”® A similar 
comment was made in a broad critique of the company by the Indian agent Samuel 
N. Latta in 1862:
This old American Fur Company (so called) is the most corrupt 
institution ever tolerated in our country. They have involved the 
government in their speculations and schemes; they have enslaved 
the Indians, kept them in ignorance; taken from them year after year 
their pitiful earnings, in robes and furs, without giving them an 
equivalent; discouraged them in agriculture by telling them that should 
the white man find that their country would produce they would come in 
and take their lands from them. They break up and destroy every 
opposition to their trade that ventures into their country, and frien make 
up their losses by extorting from the Indians.36
At the time of Latta’s report the American Fur Company was only three years 
away from dissolving and its hold on the Upper Missouri was slipping. The 
Democratic sympathies of American Fur Company employees hampered the 
company’s political influence, renewed trading opposition threatened its monopoly, 
the fur market remained poor due to the war, Sioux belligerence was interfering with 
trade, and reports of gold in the northwestern mountains meant swarms of wealth- 
seekers would soon t>e heading up the river. By 1865 these forces had taken their 
toll, and, simultaneously with the Civil War, the American Fur Company came to an 
end. The vacuum it left soon was filled by a number of smaller firms engaged in 
both trade and the growing shipping business on the Missouri. With the American 
Fur Company’s demise, many of its employees remained in the west -  becoming 
independent traders, teamsters, shop keepers, boatmen, guides, ranchers, and 
miners -  helping to open for settlement the same land the early fur trade had sought 
to keep shut.
The end of the American Fur Company signaled the end of one era and the 
beginning of another for the Upper Missouri country. The first brought a gradual
“  Journal of Rudolph Friedrich Kurz: An Account of His Experiences Among Fur Traders and 
American Indians on the f^ississippi and the Upper Missouri Rivers During the years 1646 to 1852 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 177.
Samuel N. Latta, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862- 
1863, H. exdoc 2, (Serial 1157), 340-1.
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decline in the range and population of northern bison as a result of consistent and 
prolonged indigenous subsistence and market hunting. It was also characterized by 
a small transitory Euroamerican population of traders and river men nominally 
accepted by the native one. The second culminated in a short, intensive, and wholly 
destructive exploitation of northern bison by non-native hunters; an emphasis on 
mineral and agricultural, rather than wildlife, resources; and a dramatic rise in the 
Euroamerican population, which brought with it an equivalent rise in Indian/white 
conflict.®
From the end of the Civil War until the late seventies and the start of the 
northern hide hunt, there is little reason to think that the sometimes-reached pre-Civil 
War average of 100,000 robes a year traded on the Upper Missouri was 
exceeded. Although accurate shipment statistics are hard to come by for this period, 
this is a safe statement for a number of reasons. For one, until approximately 1878 
Native Americans remained the primary procurers and processors of bison on the 
Northern Plains. Probably the most significant limitation on the number of robes that 
could be traded at a given time, prior to the hide hunt, was the labor-intensive 
process involved in curing the product. Although it was usually Indian men who killed 
the buffalo, in the autumn or winter if the animal’s pelt was to be used in trade, it was 
the women who did the bulk of the work in preparing the robes. Although a robe 
could take less than three days of labor to process by one woman, the work was 
difficult and a woman generally prepared ten robes for market in a single season.^ 
Further, because of disease, war fatalities, and the fact that the northern bison range 
had diminished to what is now present day Montana and northern Wyoming , not as
many tribes, and subsequently not as many individual Indians, were actively
Sunder, The Fur Trade of the Upper Missouri, 220, 240-1, 252, 259-265; Bradley, "Affairs at 
Fort Benton," Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, vol. Ill, 285; Charles Larpenteur, 
Forty Years a Fur Trader on the Upper Missouri: The Personal Narrative of Charles Larpenteur,
1833-1872 (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1933), 277.
Journal of Rudolph Friedrich Kurz: An Account of His Experiences Among Fur Traders and 
American Indians on the Mississippi and fhe Upper Missouri Rivers During the years 1846 to 1852 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 176; Burlingame, The Economic Importance of the 
Buffalo in the Northern Plains Region, 141. For details of the actual process of robe manufacture 
see Tom McHugh, The Time of the Buffalo (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 94-97. For the 
gender implications of this processing strategy see Philip Duke, Points in Time (Boulder: 
University Press of Colorado, 1991), 141-181.
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involved in ttie robe trade during this period. But the impact on northern buffalo of
100,000 robes per year traded in the sixties and seventies was probably far more 
detrimental than it was earlier in the century. Because the overall numbers of buffalo 
appears to have decreased across the northern plains by the 1860s, 100,000 
robes meant a much larger percentage of northern buffalo killed than a like number 
earlier in the century.
Although some observers from the period believed as many as 250,000 
buffalo hides were shipped from Fort Benton alone as early as 1874, one must 
agree with Frank Gilbert Roe, an authority on the North American history of the horse 
and bison, that this is an impossible figure. Steamboat records for T. C. Powers and 
Company, at the time one of the more important -  but not the only -  transport and 
trading firms on the Upper Missouri, show that only 16,240 robes or hides were 
sent down river from Benton in 1874. According to these same records, the peak of 
robe or hide shipments sent by steamer from Fort Benton came in 1878, with 
28,323 being transported. After this year the country surrounding the fort declined 
as a major hunting ground, with the plains of southeastern Montana becoming the 
primary final refuge for the buffalo, and the one most vigorously tapped by the white 
hide hunters when they finally made it onto the Northem Plains.^
In 1870 bison still numbered in the millions on the Southern Plains and white 
hide hunters are most responsible for the near complete slaughter of these 
remaining animals by the middle of the decade. Tbese men, unlike Indian hunters, 
were not limited by the number of hides that their wife, or wives, could tan; rather, 
they took advantage of rapid and efficient railroad transportation and the newly 
developed industrial tanning process. For reasons discussed later, hide hunters 
were prevented from tapping the northern buffalo until 1878, and did not truly begin 
hunting there on a large scale until 1881.
Once hide hunters did venture onto the Northern Plains the buffalo vanished 
within a few years, becoming virtually extinct by the end of 1883. William T. 
Hornaday estimated that 300,000 hides were shipped east by non-native hunters
L. V. Kelly, The Rangemen, (Toronto, 1913), 111; Roe, The North American Buffalo, 454-455; 
T. C. Powers Collection, Helena, Montana: Montana Historical Society Archives.
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from the Northern Plains between 1881 and 1883/° A proficient hunter with a good 
.50 caliber rifle could kill as many as 100 buffalo in a day.'*’ One exceptional hunter 
on the Southern Plains killed 5,855 bison in two months.'*  ̂ The Montana pioneer 
and historian Granville Stuart observed at the time that “from the Porcupine clear to 
Miles City the bottoms are liberally sprinkled with the carcasses of dead buffalo. In 
many places they lie thick on the ground, fat and the meat not yet spoiled, all 
murdered for their hides which are piled like cord wood all along the way. Tis In awd̂ ul 
sight.”^ Despite their killing proficiency, the hide hunters only brought to a close a 
process of bison decline that preceded them. And thus, additional factors that 
impacted the buffalo’s place on the Northern Plains require examination.
^ William T. Hornaday, The Extermination of the American Bison, with a Sketch of its Discovery 
and Life H/sto/y (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1887). “Champion Buffalo 
Hunter” Vic Smith wrote that 400,000 buffalo were killed in one winter between 1881-82. See 
Victor Grant Smith, Champion Buffalo Hunter, Jeanette Prodgers, ed. (Helena: Twodot Press, 
1997), 98.
Rex W. Strickland, ed., “The Recollections of W. S. Glenn, Buffalo Hunter,” Panhandle-Plains 
Historical Review 22 (1949), 25-31 ; John R. Cook, The Border and the Buffalo: An Untold Story 
of the Southwestern Plains, Milo M. Quaife, ed. (Chicago: Lakeside, 1938), 159-171.
Wayne Gard, The Great Buffalo Hunf (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959) 128-129.
^ Granville Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier as Seen in the Journals and Reminiscences of 
Granville Stuart: Gold Miner, Trader, Merchant, Rancher and Politician, vol. 2 (Cleveland: The 
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1925), 104.
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Chapter Two:
Gold Strikes and Grazing: The Impact of Humans and their Animals on the
Northern Bison Range
In March of 1863, six men -  Barney Hughes, Tom Cover, Henry Rodgers, 
Bill Fairweather, Henry Edgar and Bill Sweeney -  left their winter camp in western 
Montana’s Deer Lodge valley to seek their fortune. Miners by inclination but with 
little to show for it, the group had left Elk City, Idaho, the previous summer heading 
east in the hope of finding fresh diggings. They decided to try their luck in the remote 
Big Horn mountains to the southwest, and left their winter camp with the intention of 
meeting another prospecting party led by James Stuart. After passing an old camp 
of Stuart’s, Hughes and his group followed Granite Creek and crossed over to the 
Madison River. As they crossed the Madison Plateau, with the sharp snow covered 
peaks of the Gallatin range towering to the south, the men were in the heart of Big 
Sky Country. Unfortunately, the beauty of the land was matched by its danger. Not 
far from the Three Forks of the Missouri river, the area the men traveled bordered a 
risky hunter’s paradise traversed by war parties of the Nez Perce, Blackfeet, Crows, 
Bannocks, Salish, Pend Oreilles, and Sioux. Now it was being crossed by white 
miners whose vision of the land differed greatly from the tribes Hughes and his party 
hoped to avoid. For the Indians who came there, the richness of the Northern Plains 
and mountains lay on the surface of the land: in the teeming herds of buffalo and 
horses that crossed it, in the grass that grew from it, and in the water that coursed 
through it. For the miners, the abundance of the land came from below: in minerals 
and metals formed there millions of years before. Both visions shaped the land, and 
ultimately both had a hand in the fate of the buffalo.’
' John Work gives a good description of the plentiful “game” in this dangerous area, particularly 
buffalo, in his travels through the area in 1823-1824. See The Journal of John Work: A Chief- 
Trader of the Hudson's Bay Co. During His Expedition from Vancouver to the Flatheads and 
Blackfeet of the Pacific /Vorthwesf (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1923), 98-109. The 
Montana pioneer Granville Stuart also noted the importance of the region as a hunting and war 
ground. See Forty Years on the Frontier as Seen in the Journals and Reminiscences of Granville 
Stuart: Gold k^ner, Trader, Merchant, Rancher artd Polilidan, Vol. 1 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 1925), 204.
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The miners continued east, forded the Gallatin river and then veered slightly
north, ultimately reaching Shield’s river, which they followed to the Yellowstone.
After a month of travel, still without meeting up with Stuart, the prospectors were
camped directly across from Clark’s Fork of the Yellowstone. Unfortunately for the
men, while they were at this spot Crows came upon the camp and all of the miners
were taken prisoner. After four days of deliberation, the Crows released the men,
now stripped of most of their possessions and mounted on poor horses. The
disgruntled party continued out on their original course, traveling for only half a day
when they were again overtaken by the Crows. The tribe had changed its mind and
told the miners they must either turn around or die. The Crows did not want miners
on their land. With little choice, Hughes and his band headed back the way they had
come. On their return trip the prospectors idly checked here and there for “color.” On
May 22, at a place later called Alder Gulch, they got lucky. The strike soon proved
to be a substantial one and it, along with other rich mining claims that followed, quickly
opened the floodgates of American settlement on what would become the territory
and then state of Montana.^
In the winter of 1862-1863, fewer than 700 non-natives lived in what is now
the state of Montana.^ Two years later the number increased to almost 15,000.^
Considering that in 1857 the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Upper Missouri
estimated the entire Native American population under his charge -  which included
the most numerous Montana tribes -  at 24, 248 souls, the dramatic influx of
Euroamericans was a serious boon to the region’s human population.^ Even in
1861, before the main rush of gold-seekers came to Montana, a rising stream of
miners and other emigrants was coming up the Missouri to Fort Benton. From here 
 ̂This account of the discovery of Alder Gulch is taken from those of Henry Edgar and Peter 
Roman. See, "Journal of Henry Edgar, 1863,” and “Discovery of Alder Gulch,” Contributions to 
the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. ill (Boston: J.S. Canner and Company Inc., 1966),124-142 
and 143-152 respectively.
® “A Ust of All Persons Who Were In What is Now Montana During the Winter of 1862-3, Which 
Was the First Winter After the Gold Mines of This Region Had Become Noised Abroad," 
Contributions to Uie Historical Society of Montana, Vol. I (Boston: J. S. Canner and Company Inc., 
1966), 334-54. This account is only for whites living in the area.
 ̂Granville Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier, Vol.2, 21.
* Alexander H. Redfield, Annual Report of ffie Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1858, H. exdoc. 2, 425.
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they could travel the recently completed Mullan road westward, taking it as far as Fort 
Walla Walla in Washington Territory if they so desired.® Although Mullan’s overland 
route never became a major artery of western travel, it was busy enough to Impact 
the region's ecology. This impact is summed up well in the 1862 diary of James 
Harkness. Traveling from Fort Benton to Deer Lodge on a trading venture,
Harkness recorded: “(gjame very scarce owing to the emigrants."^ In earlier years 
western Montana valleys like the Deer Lodge, Big Hole, Beaverhead, and 
Jefferson were visited by buffalo and other wildlife, but as whites began to settle the 
region the animals became scarce. It seems the Crows probably had some idea of 
what the white’s quest for gold might bring when they refused to let the miners pass 
in May of 1863.
Although the troops of prospectors undoubtedly ate buffalo when they 
could, their hunger was probably less damaging to the ungulate’s range and 
population than other things the group brought with them. Prospectors needed 
horses, mules, and oxen for transportation, and 15,000 miners meant a considerable 
amount of domesticated animals were hoofing it into Montana. The growing mining 
camps also needed a steady supply of meat and, to serve this purpose, cattle 
began to dot the ranges of western Montana. Raising livestock was such a success 
in the region that in the 1870s the “Great American Desert” view of the Northem 
Plains had changed to “the Great Western Pastoral Region.”® As early as the mid- 
1850s one Indian agent of the Upper Missouri went so far as to say ‘there is not a 
possibility of overstocking the country, subsistence being inexhaustible...”® By the 
1870s the national press was espousing similar views and settlers and their animals
* William H. Goetzman, Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 {New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959), 422.
' “Diary of James Harkness, of the Arm of Lataarge, Harkness, and Company: St. Louis to Fort 
Benton by the Missouri river and to the Deer Lodge Valley and Return in 1862,” Contributions to 
the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. II (Boston; J.S. Canner and Company, Inc., 1966), 352.
® John L. Allen, "The Garden-Desert Continuum: Competing Views of the Great Plains in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Great Plains Quarterly 5 (1885), 207-20.
® Thomas S. Twiss, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 34th Cong., 3rd sess., 1856, H. 
exdoc. 1 (Serial 893), 647.
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were moving onto the Northern Plains in increasing numbers/" Unfortunately for the 
bison, their dietary needs overlapped considerably with that of the encroaching 
livestock, putting the animals in competition with each other.
In 1860 the cattle herds of present day Montana were summed up by 
Granville Stuart as “a small herd at St. Ignatius, a few at Fort Owen, and about two 
hundred head in and near fort Benton." As non-natives came to the region in 
increasing numbers after 1863, however, so did their animals. By 1880 there were
250,000 cattle in Montana and that number dramatically rose to 600,000 by 1883, 
the same year the range was cleared of the remaining bison. Cattle herds, like 
horses, on the Central and Southern Plains were larger and present for a longer 
period than in the north, and likely were more damaging to the bison range in those 
areas. Nevertheless, northem cattlemen penetrated the hunting grounds of northem 
tribes and certainly had a negative impact on the buffalo. Tribes were 
understandably incensed by white ranchers and raided the latter frequently. By 
1881 stockmen had so infiltrated the northem hunting grounds, and were so 
incessantly harassed by Indians because of it, that they formed the Stockgrowers 
Protective Association to forcibly curb Indian depredations of livestock. Granville 
Stuart, one of its founders, actually used the Blackfeet Treaty of 1855 to support the 
claims of cattlemen. He noted that the treaty acknowledged tribal hunting rights for 
99 years so long as there was game. Stuart reasoned that cattle had invaded the 
hunting grounds to the extent, and pushed out native wildlife enough, that the treaty 
rights no longer held. The tribes took a decidedly different, but ultimately ineffective.
view.”
Whites were not the only humans whose animals vied with bison for feed. 
For over a century prior to the Montana mining boom, the horses of northern tribes
James R. Shortridge, “The Expectations of Others: Struggles Toward a Sense of Place in the 
Northern Plains," Many Wests: Place, Culture, & Regional Identity, David M. Wrobel & Michael C. 
Steiner, eds., (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 118.
” Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier, Vol. 2, 97,156-162,187-88. For the delay of the presence 
of cattle and agriculture on the northern plains see Coupland, “The Effects of Fluctuations in 
Weather," 280. A well done case study of the effects of livestock and settlement on one Montana 
valley can be found in William Wyckoff & Katherine Hansen, “Settlement, Livestock Grazing and 
Environmental Change in Southwest Montana, 1860-1990," Environmental History Review ^5 
(Winter 1991), 45-71.
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were primary competitors with buffalo over Northern Plains grasses. Horses came 
first to the southwestern plains, brought by the Spanish in the seventeenth century. 
In 1680 Puebloan groups, violently oppressed by the Spanish encomienda 
system and intolerance of native beliefs, revolted and forced the Spanish back into 
Mexico. The Spanish horses remained, however, and very quickly the animals, and 
the knowledge needed to care for them, spread northward via indigenous trading 
networks. As early as 1742, according to the explorer and trader Chevalier de la 
Verendrye, the Shoshones were well supplied with horses, and most other northern 
tribes had them.’  ̂ Although some tribes hunted buffalo for hundreds of years prior 
to the introduction of the horse, they were only partially dependent on the animal for 
food. Horticultural peoples such as the Hidatsas, Mandans, Pawnees, and their 
precursors, hunted to supplement their crops of corn, beans and squash. The 
coming of the horse, and the mobility it provided, allowed other tribes living outside, 
or on the periphery, of the plains to move out onto the grasslands and pursue bison 
hunting full time. Tribes like the Assiniboines, Atsinas, Arapahos, Cheyennes, 
Crows (originally part of the Hidatsas), and Sioux did not become permanent 
Central and Northern Plains residents and buffalo hunters until after they acquired the 
horse.’®
Whether or not the horse produced a cultural revolution for plains tribes 
matters little here. What does matter is that the horse was an important plains 
technology used in varying degrees by some tribes to exploit the region’s elusive 
resources. Like all technology, the adoption of the horse carried both environmental 
and cultural consequences. With the horse’s use, the indigenous population of the 
Northern Plains rose to 50,000 in 1780, while added, and perhaps detrimental.
Laurence J. Burpee, ed., Journals and Letters of Pierre Gautier de Varennes de la Verendry 
and His Sons, Vol. 16 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1927), 411.
For a more detailed account of this process see Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the 
Plains: A Study of Cultural Development Among North American Indians (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1974), 89-114; Frank Raymond Secoy, Changing Military Patterns on the Great 
Plains (Locust Valley, New York: J. J. Augustin Publisher, 1953), 33-38; Isenberg, Destruction of 
the Bison, 33-44; Francis Haines, “The Northward Spread of Horses Among the Plains Indians," 
American Anthropologist AO (July-September 1938), 429-437.
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pressure was put on the region’s plant and animal resources.’'' Horses fit much the 
same ecological niche as buffalo and, along with their human masters, preferred the 
same riparian zones for shelter and sustenance when the weather turned bitterly 
cold. During the winter, when grasses were often covered by snow and lacked the 
nutritional content of spring and summer months, Indians fed their ponies the bark, 
branches, and saplings of cottonwoods and willows. Although this diet could sustain 
horses until the weather warmed, it left the animals weak and degraded important 
riparian areas over time. The latter was noted by Lt. Gouverneur K. Warren, on his 
1857 expedition in Dakota Territory, when he observed that deforestation had 
occurred in places where the Sioux had wintered their mounts.’® In the waning years 
of the pre-reservation days, these environmental constraints on horses also proved 
a liability for some tribes in their wars with the United States military. American 
soldiers capitalized on the stationary winter camps of hostile tribes, knowing their 
horses would be weak and the tribe’s fighting capacity reduced. For these reasons 
the historian James E. Sherow believes that the reliance of tribes on horses made 
their adaptation to plains life incomplete.’®
But in viewing plains Indian material culture as an “incomplete environmental 
adaptation,” Sherow ignores one other important role of the horse: it tied a number 
of tribes to an exclusive bison hunting lifestyle that was precarious at best. The very 
trading networks that allowed tribes initially to obtain horses were easily co-opted by 
white traders, whose Western manufactured trade goods induced the now highly 
mobile equestrian tribes to hunt substantially more buffalo than they needed for 
subsistence. From the mid-1830s on, buffalo products were the most important 
commodities in the Upper Missouri fur trade, with as much as 110,000 robes sent 
down river annually. Beginning in the 1840s observations that the bison were in a
Northern plains population adapted from Mooney’s estimates. See James Mooney, The 
Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1928), 13.
Gouverneur K. Warren, Preliminary Report of Explorations in Nebraska and Dakota in the Years 
1855-56-57 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 47-49.
’* James E. Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialiectic: High Plains Indians and Their Horses in the 
Region of the Arkansas River Valley, 1800-1870,” Environmental History Review 16 (Summer 
1992), 62-63, 69-74;
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steady state of decline became Increasingly more common. As previously 
discussed, not a few observers of the time held Indian market hunting as the main 
culprit. Although far from the sole cause, Indian hunting, both for subsistence and for 
the Western market, certainly stressed bison populations.
Without their mounts Indians could not have hunted buffalo to the extent that 
they did. The renowned anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber believed pre-horse 
Indians only “nibbled at the buffalo.”^̂ Frank Gilbert Roe asserted that horses made 
Indians more “conservative” hunters. Before the horse, pedestrian native hunters 
surrounded buffalo on foot, or used natural features of the land, such as cliffs and cut- 
banks, to assist them in corralling and killing large numbers of bison at once. To work, 
the entire tribe -  men and women -  needed to assist in driving the buffalo over large 
distances until the animals, ideally the entire herd, were concentrated and killed. 
According to Roe, after plains Indians acquired the horse, individuals could 
selectively hunt, no longer killing buffalo en masse. However, Roe chose not to 
emphasize that equestrian buffalo hunting was a year round -  rather than seasonal -  
endeavor, or that it was market driven. Further, the selectivity horses brought to 
buffalo hunting carried other consequences. Post-horse Native Americans could 
selectively kill cows and calves, whose tender meat was preferred by the hunters 
themselves, and whose pelts were favored by the fur traders. Over time the 
favoring of the young and females had serious consequences for the reproductive 
success of bison.’®
It is difficult to estimate how many horses western tribes had at any given 
time, but the ratio for the early nineteenth century used by one recent scholar is 
between six and fifteen horses per person.’® Estimates for nineteenth century
Indian populations are also sketchy. During the first three quarters of the nineteenth
” Alfred L. Kroeber, Cultural and Natural Areas in Native North America, Vol. 38 (Berkeley: 
University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, 1939), 88.
’* Frank Gilbert Roe, The Indian and the Horse (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 
340-62; Flores, “Bison Ecology,” 479-80; Ewers, The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture, 152. For 
a traditional account of how the Blackfeet began to use pounds, called piskans by the tribe, see 
James Willard Schultz (Apikuni), Blackfeet and Buffalo (Norman: University Oklahoma Press, 
1962), 306-319.
’* Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 26, using Flores, “Bison Ecology,” 481-82 & Sherow, 
“Workings of the Geodialectic,” 68.
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century, the Northern Plains native population lay somewhere between 25,000 and 
58,000.^ Using these figures, it is possible that there were between 150,000 and
600,000 Indian horses on the nineteenth century Northern Plains.
For several reasons, the number was probably much nearer, and perhaps 
below, the lower figure. The previously cited ratio of between six to fifteen horses 
per person was applied by historian Andrew Isenberg to horse Indians across the 
entire Plains, even though it is based on estimates specific to the Southern Plains. 
Also, when compared to the exhaustive research of anthropologist John C. Ewers, 
these figures appear quite high even for the Southern Plains. The highest 
horse/person ratio given by Ewers for any tribe over the course of the nineteenth 
century is 11.8 for the Umatillas, Walla Wallas and Cayuses -  tribes west of the 
Rocky Mountains. For the Great Plains, Ewers found that the Kiowas and 
Comanches -  Southern Plains tribes -  had the most horses per person at four. 
According to Ewers, the average for the majority of western tribes was significantly 
lower, between 0 and 2. Considering all of this, 150,000 Indian horses should be 
considered a high upper limit for the early nineteenth century Northern Plains. One 
should also note that over the course of the nineteenth century Indian horse 
populations may have declined -  an 1874 commissioner of Indian Affairs report 
shows that roughly 58,000 Northem Plains Indians had only 40,000 horses.®̂
Even if a decisive population estimate for nineteenth century western horse 
herds remains elusive, there is little doubt that most northern tribes had significantly 
fewer horses per capita than Indians further south. The crux of the extensive 
examination of the historical record by Ewers supports this assertion fully. A
comparison between two sets of figures, the first for the Northern Plains and the
“  These figures are adapted from a number of sources. See Alexander H. Redfield, Annual 
Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 1858, H. exdoc. 2, 425; James 
Mooney, The Aboriginal Population of America North of (Mexico (Washington, DC.: Government 
Printing Office, 1928), 13; Kurz, “Journal,” 165-66. See also the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1874 cited in John C. Ewers, The Horse in Blackfoot Indian 
Culture: With Comparative h/laterial From Other Western Tribes (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1955), 28. Frank Gilbert Roe has accumulated a vast array of population figures, 
often contradictory, from a wealth of primary and secondary sources. See Roe, The North 
American Buffalo, 742-803.
Ewers, The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture, 20-32. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report 
cited in Ibid, 28.
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second for the southern, offers an illustration. According to Lieutenant James H. 
Bradley, a soldier as well as amature historian and ethnographer of Montana, the 
horses per lodge for a number of northern tribes circa 1830 are as follows: Crow -  
fifteen; Piegan -ten; Blackfoot and Blood -  five; Gros Ventre (of the prairie) -  five; 
Flathead and Nez Perce -  fifty; Assiniboine -  two.^ Although the Sioux are not 
included here, they probably had averages similar to the Blackfeet. Mid-century 
figures given by W. D. Whitfield, Indian agent for the Upper Arkansas agency, 
indicate that the more southerly Comanches, Kiowas, Plains Apaches and Southern 
Arapahos had an average of 6.25 horses per person. The Southern Cheyennes 
had a slightly smaller average of 5.55.^ These latter figures are higher than those of 
Ewers, but not dramatically so. Depending on the tribe, estimates on the number of 
people per lodge on the Northern Plains fluctuated between two and sixteen.̂ "*
Even If one uses the conservative average of two people per lodge, when factored 
with Bradley’s figures northern Indians -  save perhaps the Crow -  had significantly 
fewer horses per person than those to the south. The above 1874 Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs report verifies this. According to the report approximately 28,000 
Southern and Central Plains Indians had roughly 10,000 more horses than 
approximately 58,000 Northern Plains Indians. This report is particularly interesting 
because at the time it was written many northern tribes were still equestrian bison 
hunters. Tribes to the south, however, were confined to reservations and left by 
white hide hunters with almost no buffalo to hunt, and yet they still had more horses 
than Indians to the north.
Alan J. Osburn has used Ewers as a platform to attribute the fewer horses of 
northem tribes to harsh winters, which made it difficult to maintain large herds.^
Relative to the Southern Plains, northern grasslands experienced a shorter growing
^ James H. Bradley, “Characteristics of the Blackfeet,” Contributions to the Historical Society of 
Montana, vol. 9 (Helena, Montana: Naegele Printing Co., 1940), 288.
“  W. D. Whitfield, Census of the Cheyenne, Comanche, Arapaho, Plains Apache, and the Kiowa 
of the Upper Arkansas Agency, 15 August 1855, U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Record Group 75, M234, roll 
878 cited in Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic,” 68.
Frank Gilbert Roe, The North American Buffalo, 747-748.
“  Alan J. Osburn, “Ecological Aspects of Equestrian Adaptations in Aboriginal North America,” 
American Anthropologist, 85 (1983), 563-91.
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season and a longer winter dormancy -  a time when short grasses lose over half of 
their summer protein.* Northern horses, then, were forced to subsist for longer 
periods on the less nutritious supplements of cottonwood and willow. During 
average northem winters, Ewers has found that these seasonal feeding strategies 
were probably enough to prevent heavy horse losses. However, during more 
severe winters, losses to northern herds could be heavy.̂  ̂ Such was the case 
during the bitter winter of 1862, when the Montana pioneer Granville Stuart reported 
that “...the Indians that were over in buffalo country suffered terribly...[tjhey lost most 
of their horses.” Another likely consequence of more difficult northern winter climes, 
when human interventions were important to horse viability, was far fewer wild 
horses in the north than in the south. This, and the relatively silent historical record on 
the subject, indicate that the two million wild mustangs purportedly living on the 
Southern Plains was nowhere repiicated on the Northern Plains. Northern bison, 
then, were spared the far more intense competition over grasses faced by the 
animal on the Plains to the south.*
This is very significant to understanding why northern bison fared better than 
the animals elsewhere in the West. The dietary overlap of horses and bovines 
posed a serious problem for buffalo by reducing grassland carrying capacity. 
Although it varied greatly according to location, grass type, and precipitation, 
approximately seven acres worth of grass a day were needed to feed one 
thousand horses. A substantial population of horses and other domesticates on the 
range, then, had the potential of seriously reducing the number of bison the plains 
could support. This was certainly true for the Southern Plains, where an estimated 
.25 to .5 million Indian horses and two million wild mustangs likely consumed the 
forage of over two million bison. On the Northern Plains, where there were far fewer 
Indian and wild horses, the equestrian impact on the buffalo range was probably far
“  Sherow, “The Workings of the Geodialectic," 71.
John C. Ewers, "Were the Blackfeet Rich in Horses," American Anffiropologist 45 (1943), 605- 
607.
^ Flores. “Bison Ecology,” 481. That horses are well adapted to desert environments also 
promoted their larger numbers on the drier and warmer southern plains. See C. M. Williams, 
"Climatic Impact on the Livestock Industry,” Symposium on the Impacts of Climatic Change and 
Variability on the Great Plains (Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, 1991), 353-355.
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less.^
Henry Edgar, and the miners that traveled with him, surely gave little thought 
to the possible ecological Implications of their horses as they rode them onto the 
Plains to find their fortune -  nor the dramatic changes finding that fortune would bring 
to the West. Similarly, the Crow who stopped the miners, probably did not 
recognize the environmental constraints that led them to rob the white men of their 
ponies. In a northern environment that was particularly hard on horses, stealing, 
rather than breeding, was a far more certain way to acquire mounts. Both parties 
were caught in a rising flood of cultural and environmental change that promised to 
leave in its wake a western landscape changed in ways no one -  Indian or white -  
could predict.
Sherow, “The Workings of the Geodialectic," 69-70; Flores, "Bison Ecology,” 481.
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Chapter Three:
A Changing Climate and Ecology
Horses and other domesticates were not alone In making the Plains a more 
difficult place for bison to survive. From the fourteenth century to the mid-nineteenth 
century, a climatic period known as the Little Ice Age brought the world lower annual 
temperatures and higher annual precipitation relative to the present. These 
conditions may have benefited bison by promoting a five hundred year anomaly of 
richer grassland habitat. When the global climate returned to more “normal” 
temperature and precipitation levels droughts became more frequent and the 
grassland carrying capacity of the western plains may have diminished.'
Even though drought has been shown as an important factor In the decline of 
buffalo In some areas of the plains, its relevance to northem herds has not been 
given much attention. Beginning in 1846, and continuing for as long as nine years in 
some places, much of the Central and Southern Plains were plagued by below 
normal precipitation. If the Northern Plains were abnormally dry at the time, no one 
living there at that time mentioned It. However, dry years finally descended upon 
the region In the 1850s and continued with few respites until 1866. In 1865, while on 
an unsuccessful Powder river campaign against the Sioux, one officer remarked that 
“It seemed as If no rain had fallen In this part of the world for ages.”  ̂ Indian crops 
across the plains failed in several of these years. Alfred Vaughn lamented in the fall 
of 1855 that ‘the great drought in that region of the country [Upper Missouri] was 
such that all kinds of vegetation presented but a very languishing appearance.” The
’ H. H. Lamb, Climate Present, Past, and Future Vol. 2: Climatic History and the FuTt/re (London: 
Methuen and Co., 1977), 461-473. For a comparison between nineteenth and twentieth century 
climates in the United States see E. W. Wahl and T. L. Lawson, “The Climate of the Midnineteenth 
Century United States Compared to the Current Normals,” Monthly Weather Review 98 (April 
1970), 259-265.
 ̂“Col. Samuel Walker’s Report.” Powder River Campaigns and Sawyers Expedition of 1865: A 
Documentary Account Comprising Official Reports, Diaries, Contemporary Newspaper Accounts, 
and Personal Narratives, Leroy R. Hafen & Ann W. Hafen, eds. (Glendale: The Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 1961), 96.
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crops of the village horticultural tribes were reduced by two-thirds from lack of rain/ 
Not until 1858 did northern grasslands get a break when, according to Vaughn, “more 
rain fell in the valley of the Upper Missouri during the months of July and August last 
than during the whole preceding five years. ""
Interestingly, the impact of drought may have been felt less had trappers 
earlier in the century not devastated northern beaver populations. The 
anthropologist R. Grace Morgan has noted the importance of beavers in maintaining 
standing bodies of water that provided areas of refuge and sustenance to both 
humans and animals in an often arid plains environment. Most plains tribes had 
cultural taboos against hunting beavers, Morgan argues, in part because Indians 
knew their environment and the beneficial role of beaver in it. Beavers stabilized 
and conserved water resources that became especially Important during periods of 
drought. Eventually the fur trade and increased intertribal animosity eroded tribal 
proscriptions against beaver hunting and added to the devastation of northern 
beaver populations wrought by white trappers.® By 1831 the trader William 
Gordan was able to report that the devastation of the beaver in the Upper Missouri 
and Rocky Mountains was “general and extensive.”® Although the fur trade shifted 
its focus to buffalo, the earlier destruction of beavers continued to impact Northern 
Plains ecology by making buffalo and Indians more susceptible to periods of little 
rain.
Dry years also impeded American attempts to turn Indians into “civilivized” 
famers. Unfortunately for the Indian agents, they tried to get northern tribes to till the 
soil beginning in the 1850s, just as drought began to grip the region.^ Many of the
 ̂Alfred Vaughn, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 1855, H. 
exdoc. 1, 392-393; A. M. Robinson, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1858, H. exdoc. 2, (Serial 997), 427; Vaughn, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1856, H. exdoc. 1, (Serial 893), 630;
" Alfred Vaughn, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1858, H. 
exdoc. 2, (Serial 997), 429; Harry E. Weakly, “A Tree-Ring Record of Precipitation in Western 
Nebraska,” Journal of Forestry, 41 (November 1943), 816-819.
® R. Grace Morgan, “Beaver Ecology Beaver Mythology” (Ph.D dissertation in Anthropology, 
University of Alberta, 1991), 1-17
® Gordan to William Clark, October 27,1831, in Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 1834-1839, Anne 
Heloise Abel, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 352.
' Davidson, “Climate Variability on the Northern Great Plains,”11.
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tribes persuaded by agents to try farming had already been horticulturalists on some 
level only a century before, when they climbed atop horses and took up bison 
hunting full time. Subsequently, history and climate worked against the agricultural 
dreams of Indian agents and only reinforced the native perception that the hunt was 
far better than the plow. The Blackfeet agent Henry W. Reed observed in 1862 
that the “Indians do not seem to have received any very encouraging views of 
farming from the experiment.”® It appears that the Brule Sioux, Iron Nation, agreed 
with Reed, when in a statement made a few years later he said: “(w]e have planted 
corn and the frosts kill it -  we do not...like to plant corn, we had rather hunt buffalo...”® 
Another Sioux, Spotted Tail, spoke in a similar vein: “[t]he Great Father wants us to 
plant corn...we want to live as our fathers have lived on the buffalo and the deer that 
we now find on our hunting grounds.”’® Ironically, white attempts to make Indians 
farmers in a time of drought only made them more ardent bison hunters.
Unlike domesticated crops, western shortgrasses were especially adapted to 
survive dry periods, but they did so at the nutritional expense of the ungulates that 
fed upon them. The first response of grasslands to drought is a decrease in the 
forage yield, which is matched by a decrease in grassland carrying capacity. If 
severe enough, malnutrition can make animals more susceptible to disease, reduce 
fertility (already an important nineteenth century factor for buffalo because of 
selective human hunting), and reduce the viability of offspring. The devastating 
drought of the Great Depression saw a reduction of forage yield in Montana of 
seventy-five percent in just three years. In 1942, in southeastern Alberta, twelve 
acres produced the same amount of feed that seventy acres grew during the 
drought year of 1936. But the drought year of 1860 was even worse: only two 
thirds of the precipitation of the worst years of the Dust Bowl fell on the Great
®Henry W. Reed, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862-63, 
H. exdoc. 2, {Serial 1157). For drought and Indian agriculture see R. D. Hart, Indian Agriculture in 
America, Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987).
® Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier, Vol. 2, 70, 72.
Quoted in Jeffrey Ostler, “’’The Regard Their Passing as Wakan”: Interpreting Western Sioux 
Explanations for the Bison’s Decline”, Western Historical Quarterly 30 (Winter 1999), 489.
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Plains." While drought more frequently impacted Southern and Central plains 
bison, exceptionally dry periods undoubtedly hurt northern herds as well. In fact, the 
severe drought of 1883 probably helped the hide hunters finish off the remaining 
northem buffalo.’^
Drought intensified the impact of grazing animals on western grasslands, and it 
did much the same for a few other environmental mainstays of the plains: 
grasshoppers and fire. Although Walt Disney made a soft spot in some hearts for a 
cricket named Jiminy, nineteenth century westerners harbored little love for the insect. 
The Journals and memoirs of western travelers bear testament to the devastating 
potential of grasshoppers. Yet histories of nineteenth century bison decline have all 
but ignored the impact these creatures had on the plains. In 1936 the ranges of 
western North Dakota lost as much as 40 percent of their new growth to 
grasshoppers. Sixty-two years earlier, in 1874, the Northern Plains were sieged by 
swarms of the insects so thick observers wrongly took them for storm clouds. In 
some places they covered the ground six inches deep." William Ludlow, a captain 
of engineers with Custer’s Black Hills expedition of that year, estimated that 
grasshoppers covered the plains near Fort Lincoln a hundred per square foot. 
Although he picturesquely compared their descent from the sky to falling snow 
flakes, Ludlow went so far as to call grasshoppers “one of the most serious
" D. Bark, “History of American Droughts,” North American Droughts, AAAS Selected Symposium 
15, N. J. Rosenberg, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 9-23.
Bamforth, Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains, 75; Coupland, “The Effects of 
Fluctuations in Weather on the Grasslands of the Great Plains," 288; Frederic Clements, “Drouth 
Periods and Climatic Cycles, “ Ecology 2 (July 1921),187; W. M. Dawson, R.W. Phillips, and S. R. 
Speelman, “Growth of Horses under Western Range Conditions,” Journal of Animal Science, 4 
(1945), 47-54. A nice overview of the interplay between human manipulation and climate on the 
Great Plains can be found in John A. Harrington, Jr. and Jay R. Harman, “Climate and Vegetation 
in Central North America: Natural Patterns and Human Alterations,” Great Plains Quarterly 11 
(Spring 1991), 103-112.
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obstacles to the future successful colonization of the country.”^̂ Grasshoppers were 
so bad in eastern Montana in the spring of 1863 that James Stuart anticipated that 
“there will not be a spear of grass here In two weeks.” ®̂ A year later the country 
surrounding the Yellowstone river was “stripped of vegetation” owing to “drouth and 
grasshoppers.” Fortunately for the the Sioux, this seriously impeded the 
effectiveness of General Alfred Sully’s 1864 campaign against the tribe. In another 
expedition twelve years later, Captain John G. Bourke mentioned that while 
camped along the Tongue river “the heat of ttie sun was tempered by a gauze veil 
which inspection showed to be a myriad of grasshoppers seeking fresh fields of 
devastation.”’  ̂ In 1870 an agent for the Yankton Sioux recommended removing the 
tribe from “a climate where crops are so uncertain owing to the scarcity of rain and the 
ravages of the grasshopper...” He goes even further, saying that “...in five years of 
the last ten the crops were totally destroyed by the drought and grasshopper, and in 
one year of the ten there was about half a crop...’”® Andrew Isenberg uses an 1864 
account of Oglalla Sioux supplementing their diet with Rocky Mountain locusts to 
illustrate the often meager rations of plains nomads. He might have missed a larger 
point: the Sioux were lacking in meat t>ecause of the very insects they were eating. 
Grasshoppers (particularly after mild winters did not destroy the eggs) had the 
potential, when combined with periods of low rainfall, to reduce the carrying capacity 
of western ranges.’®
Unlike grasshoppers, fire could be both beneficial and devastating to the 
plains and the people and animals who lived on them. The significance of fire 
ecology to native North America, and more specifically to the plains and buffalo, has
William Ludlow, Report of a Reconnaissance of the Black Hills of Dakota, Made in the Summer of 
1874 (Washington, D. C.; Government Printing Office, 1875), 9-10.
James Stuart, “The Yellowstone Expedition of 1863,” Contributions to the Historical Society of 
Montana, Vol. I, 212.
John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crooke (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 338- 
39.
Quoted in footnote 19 in Waldo R. Wedel, “Environment and Native Subsistence Economies in 
the Central Great Plains,” Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, Vol. 101, Number 3 
(Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1941), 22-23.
Nicholas Hilger, “General Alfred Sully’s Expedition of 1864, ” Contributions to the Historical 
Society of Montana, Vol. II, 320; Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 73.
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been addressed in detail by other authors, but a brief summary can be made here. 
For centuries Indians strategically burned the prairies in the spring, understanding that 
many grasses thrived in burned over areas. Edwin Denig, an important Upper 
Missouri trader and ethnologist, found grass “more lively and thick than the former 
owing to its having been freed by the fire from all briars and decayed vegetation.”^ 
The new growth attracted buffalo and other grazers, allowing tribes to more easily 
hunt the animals. Burning kept shrubs and trees from invading the plains and taking 
over. Intentionally firing the prairie also allowed tribes to more directly manipulate 
animal migrations, if the winds were right, by forcing them in a certain direction. The 
same strategy could also be used defensively to keep other tribes away from, or 
force them out of, key hunting grounds.^
Unfortunately, fire could go quickly from a useful indigenous tool to an 
uncontrollable plains nightmare. Throughout the summer and fall nineteenth century 
observers on the Plains frequently saw fires burning, some set intentionally and 
others accidentally lit or caused by lightning. The 1834-1839 journals of Francis 
Chardon, the principle trader at Fort Clark near the Mandan and Hidatsa villages, are 
sprinkled with accounts like “weather continues smokey,” and “the prairies are on fire.” 
Chardon specifically blamed the Arickaras and Yankton Sioux for some of these 
blazes. Others were probably accidental. Chardon himself started one grassland 
fire simply because he had “nothing else to do.”“  The impact of flame on buffalo 
could be substantial. In 1819 Wilhelm Ferdinand Wentzel recorded that “fire having 
overrun the plains in Red River, buffaloes had become so scarce that none were to 
be found nearer than the upper part of the Pembina River.”"̂  Other accounts 
describe buffalo blinded and blackened by fire with “half roasted carcasses” of the
Edwin Denig, Five Indian Tribes, 107.
For the significance of fire to the nineteenth century plains see Andrew Isenberg, The 
Destruction of the Bison, 26, 43, 70-2, 75, 84, 130,138; James H. Shaw and Tracy S. Carter, 
“Bison Movements in Response to Fire and Seasonality,” Wildlife Society Bulletin 18 (1990), 426- 
30; Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History {New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1999), 101-122.
“  Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark. 1834-1839, Anne Heloise Abel, ed. (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1997), 7, 8, 37, 45,
“ Quoted in Roe, The North American Buffalo, 370.
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24animals scattered along the plains/
Fire was an important defensive tool used by tribes against one another, but 
it was also used, particularly by the Sioux, in their wars against the United States 
military. An American colonel complained in 1865 that for as much as two hundred 
miles his company’s mounts were dying daily from a lack of grass arising in part from 
Indian burning. In 1876, Lakotas burned the plains of eastern Montana for “not less 
than one hundred miles each way" from the Tongue river. Captain John Bourke 
described the vast expanse of burned over land “as destitute as the Sahara 
Although these blazes hampered the offensive efforts of American soldiers, it 
probably did as much harm to the Sioux and other northern tribes dependent on 
forage for their horses and bison.
By the 1860s the Sioux from the east had effectively driven the buffalo west 
of the Little Missouri river, while other tribes and white settlement were constricting 
the northern bison range from tfie west, north and south. As the northern range of 
buffalo shrank to the grasslands of Montana and northem Wyoming by the 1870s 
ttie impact of human and environmental factors on the land and bison increased 
considerably. In earlier times, if the western plains were hard hit by drought, insects, 
or ravaged by fire, bison could migrate north or eastward to take advantage of the 
improved conditions brought by latitudinal and longitudinal changes. When humans, 
Indian and white, prohibited this migratory safety valve by effectively surrounding 
bison on all sides, buffalo were far more susceptible to population loss from human 
and environmental pressures.^
Among scholars interested in bison there has been an ongoing debate about
W. Raymond Wood and Thomas D. Thiessen, eds., “Charles McKenzie’s Narratives,” Early Fur 
Trade on the Northern Plains: Canadian Traders Among the Mandan and Hidatsa Indians, 1738- 
1818 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 230, and also quoted in Isenberg, The 
Destruction of the Bison, 71.
Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 334, 408-9.
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 141-42.Rex W. Strickland, ed., “The Recollections of 
W. S. Glenn, Buffalo Hunter,” Panhandle-Plains Historical Review 22 (1949), 25-31.
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whether or not the animal’s migrations were predictable.^ Even though the bison’s 
whereabouts were far from predetermined, the tribes, and eventually the whites, 
who hunted them could make some fairly good informed guesses. When Indians 
burned the prairie in the spring they did so to attract buffalo and other wildlife. Tribes 
also used fire to prevent bison from heading one way or to force them to go another. 
Further, Indians and whites living on the plains knew that climatic changes influenced 
bison migrations. If the weather was extremely cold, buffalo tended to seek shelter 
in forested riparian zones. However, if a winter was mild, or other observable forces 
such as prairie fires occun-ed, buffalo would likely remain on the plains making it more 
difficult for hunters to find them. According to Lieutenant Warren, Lakotas by the late 
1850s actually seemed to be herding the animals, confining them for months in the 
vicinity of the Black Hills: The whole range of the buffalo was stopped so that they 
could not proceed south, which was the point to which they were traveling. The 
intention of the Indians was to retain the buffalo in their neighborhood till their skins 
would answer for robes, then to kill the animals by surrounding one band at a time 
and completely destroying each member of it.”^
From the mid-nineteenth century onward a shrinking range reduced the 
migratory possibilities for bison and subsequently made it easier for humans to find 
and kill them. One archaeologist, Douglass Bamforth, has made a good case for an 
increase in the size of bison herds over the course of the nineteenth century as a 
result of hunting and settlement pressure. These factors -  a constricted range and 
large herd aggregations -  made it possible for white hide hunters, along with
continued indigenous hunting, to be the capstone on the grave of northern buffalo in
Those who see regularity, and by extension some predictability, in historic bison migrations 
include: G. A. Arthur, “An Introduction to the Ecology of Early Historic Communal Bison Hunting 
among the Northern Plains Tribes,” Archaeology Survey of Canada Paper 37 (Ottawa: National 
Museums of Canada, 1975); D. W. Moodie and A. J. Ray, “Buffalo Migrations in the Canadian 
Plains,” Plains Anthropologist 21 (1976), 45-52; R. G. Morgan, “Bison Movement Patterns on the 
Canadian Plains: An Ecological Analysis,” Plains Anthropologist 25 (1980), 143-160; Bamforth, 
Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains, 83-84, 147-148. For those who believe in 
a high degree of unpredictability in bison migrations see Roe, The North American Buffalo, 521- 
600; J. R Hanson. “Bison Ecology in the Northern Plains and a Reconstruction of Bison Patterns 
for the North Dakota Region,” Plains Anthropologist 29 (1984), 93-113; McHugh, Time of the 
Buffalo, 173-8.
® Gouverneur K. Warren, Preliminary Report of Explorations in Nebraska and Dakota in the Years 
1855-56-57 (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1875), 19.
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the early 1880s. The hundred bison a day a good Individual hunter could kill would 
not have been possible if herds had been small and dispersed. Technology -  in 
the form of highly accurate Sharps or Remington .50 caliber rifles -  combined with 
the ecological responses of buffalo to human and environmental pressures to make 
hide hunters extremely successful in their short-lived profession.'29
^ Bamforth, Ecology and Human Organization, 80-84.
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Chapter Four:
Death and Disease on the Upper Missouri
The changes, many of them detrimental, to the bison range wrought by the 
fur trade, domesticated animals, and an altered Northern Plains climate and ecology, 
were partially offset by the tremendous loss of human life associated with epidemics 
on the western plains in the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, determining the 
significance of this impact has long been a contentious issue for those interested in 
Native American demography. Scholars of the American Historical School, typified 
by Alfred J. Kroeber, hold that epidemics did not cause significant population decline 
in the early post-contact period, and have subsequently made fairly conservative 
population estimates for pre- and early post-contact native America. On the other 
hand, some more recent scholars, led by Henry Dobyns, have questioned the 
findings of Kroeber and his supporters, believing their pre-contact population 
estimates for aboriginal North America are far too low and that disease was a 
devastating agent of indigenous population decline from the earliest post-contact 
years onward. In the words of one archaeologist, “it is not unreasonable to suggest 
a minimal population loss of ninety percent from all introduced diseases.’”
This is a debate important to an accurate understanding of bison history. If 
disease was as rampant and destructive as Dobyns and others have asserted, then 
the vast multitude of buffalo encountered by the earliest European and American
’ Ann F. Ramenofsky, Vectors of Death: The Archaeology of European Cor)tact (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1987),171. For the conservative view of aboriginal demography 
and disease see Alfred L. Kroeber,’’Native American Population,” American Anthropologist 36 
(1934), 1 -25 and Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America, 38 (Berkeley: University of 
California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, 1939); Angel Rosenblat, T h e  
Population of Hispaniola at the Time of Columbus,” The Native Population of the Americas in 
1492, W.H. Genevan, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 43-66; Russell 
Thornton and J. Marsh-Thornton, “Estimating Prehistoric American Indian Population Size for 
United States Area: Implications of the Nineteenth Century Population Decline and Nadir,” 
American journal of Physical Anthropology 55 (1981 ), 47-54. For the contrary view see Henry F. 
Dobyns, Their Numbers Become Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern 
North America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); Shepard Krech III, “The 
Influence of Disease and the Fur Trade on Artie Dene, ” Journal of AnUiropological Research 39 
(1983), 123-46; and Noble David Cook, Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492- 
1650 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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explorers of the Plains may not reflect of the pre-contact landscape. European- 
introduced illnesses may have reached and wiped out tribes years before 
Europeans themselves actually made contact with the Indians. Subsequently, bison 
populations and range may have expanded dramatically as the animal’s human 
predators were wiped out by disease.
Erhard Rostlund has essentially made this argument in his examination of 
bison in colonial southeastern America. Rostlund asserts that prior to around 1675 
there were no accounts of bison in the region. However, for a hundred years after 
this date the animal appeared to flourish. Rostlund speculates that disease-related 
Native American mortality opened to bison a southeastern range that had previously 
been inaccessible because of a large and well organized tribal presence. Although 
the American southeast was not the grassland Mecca of the Plains, it was a region 
characterized by open park-like meadows caused by Native American burning, 
where bison would have found plenty of forage. In the West much the same thing 
occurred at approximately the same time as bison moved west of the the Rocky 
Mountains, to present day Lassen County in California. By the 1830s a growing 
Euroamerican population in both eastern and western America had pushed bison 
back onto the plains west of the Mississippi and east of the Rockies, and over the 
next fifty years the animal’s range and population continued to contract.^
It is possible that the cool, wet climate of the Little Ice Age, which may have 
increased grassland carrying capacity, combined with a disease-related decrease in 
human pressure to promote an exceptionally large North American, and more 
specifically Northern Plains, bison population and range in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Even ignoring the probable impact of disease early in the 
post-contact period (archaeological evidence suggests that large scale population 
decline in the region began as early as the seventeenth century), known epidemics 
in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century seriously reduced 
Northern Plains tribal populations. Smallpox came to Plains tribes in 1780,1801,
 ̂Erhard Rostlund, “The Geographic Range of the Historic Bison in the Southeast," 395-407; 
Valerius Geist, Buffalo Nation: History and Legend of the North American Bison (Stillwater, Minn.; 
Voyageur Press, 1996), 62-63.
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1837, and 1870, while cholera swept through the region in 1849. From 1780 to 
1877 a forty-five to seventy-nine percent reduction in tribal populations occurred, 
much of this due to disease.^
The horticultural tribes were the hardest hit by these epidemics. Their 
sedentary villages protected them from attack and made ideal centers of trade. 
Gaining an early access to European trade, and particularly the firearms it brought, 
enabled tribes like the Mandans, HIdatsas, Arikaras, and Pawnees to prosper for a 
time. Unfortunately, these villages proved excellent transmission grounds for illness 
and the perks of village life were quickly overshadowed by the ruinous effects of 
disease.** The 1780-81 smallpox epidemic destroyed as much as one-half of the 
Missouri horticultural tribes.® The French trader Jean Baptiste Truteau, on a journey 
to the Upper Missouri country in 1795, recorded that prior to the 1780 epidemic the 
Ankara had “32 populous [s/c] villages,” which were reduced by smallpox to two.® 
This population loss of the sedentary tribes was matched by a decline in power. 
Although some plains nomads were hard hit by smallpox -  the Plains Cree lost as 
many as “half of their former numbers” in the 1781 epidemic -  overall they fared 
much better than the horticulturalists.^ The lifestyle of Plains nomads limited the 
transmission of disease -  they had a relatively low population density, and moved 
their villages seasonally, which made sanitation less of a problem. Perhaps more 
importantly, their smaller, more isolated villages made epidemics, such as smallpox, 
dependent on direct person-to-person contact more difficult to get going.® From the 
1780s on, nomadic tribes took control of the Northern Plains to the detriment of the
® James Mooney, The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico, Smithsonian 
Miscellaneous Collections, vol. 80 (Washington; Smithsonian Institution, 1928), 12-13.
* Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the Plains: A Study of Cultural Development among 
North American Indians (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 84-5.
 ̂E. Wagner Steam and Allan E. Steam, The Effect of Smallpox on the Destiny of the Amerindian, 
(Boston; Bruce Humphries, 1945), 147-49.
® “Journal of Truteau on the Missouri River, 1794-1796,” Before Lewis and Clark: Documents 
Illustrating the History of the Missouri, 1785-1804, ed. A. P. Nasatir, Vol. 1 (Lincoln; University of 
Nebraska Press, 1990), 299
 ̂Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, F. W. Hodge, ed., vol. 1 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1910), 359.
® Ann McElroy and Patricia K. Townsend, Medical Anthropology in Ecological Perspective 
(Boulder; Westview Press, 1996), 137,165.
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horticufturalists. However, this process, contrary to the views of some historians, was 
not complete until another devastating epidemic in 1837.®
The 1837-38 smallpox epidemic virtually annihilated the sedentary Upper 
Missouri tribes. Francis Chardon, a trader at Fort Clark, said by the end of 
September, 1837 “seven eights of the Mandans and one half of the Rees Nations” 
had perished.'® In less than a year the former tribe of close to six hundred warriors 
was reduced to "about thirty souls.”" Jacob Halsey, another Upper Missouri trader, 
believed at the time that “10 out of 12 die with it [smallpox].”'̂  The plains nomads 
were hard hit too, but their populations tended to be higher and they could afford to 
lose more people than the horticulturalists. The ethnologist James Mooney 
believed that Upper Missouri tribes taken together to had lost “nearly one half.'"® 
Joshua Pilcher, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, wote that all told the Blackfeet, 
Assiniboines, Cheyennes, Crows and Cree, lost 25,000. The Blackfeet alone were 
reported to have lost “not less than six thousand,” which translated to close to two- 
thirds of their number. This epidemic was the deathnell for any lingering dominance 
the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arickaras still had, but it also seriously affected the 
power dynamics among the nomadic tribes. After the epidemic ran its disastrous 
course, the precarious balance of tribal power on the Northern Plains was tipped in 
favor of the many bands of Sioux, who had managed to sidestep the dramatic 
population losses that decimated other tribes.'®
Regardless of its impact on trade, smallpox and other diseases carried far- 
reaching consequences for those who survived them. After the smallpox outbreak 
in the early 1780s the Cheyenne and Oglala and Minneconjou Sioux abandoned
agriculture for good. With as much as half of the Upper Missouri’s indigenous
® Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the Plains, 84-85.
Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 1834-1839, Annie Heloise Abel, ed. (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1997), 138.
" James H. Bradley, “Affairs at Fort Benton,” 222.
Jacob Halsey to Pratte, Chouteau & Co., November 2,1837, in Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 
1834-1839, 394.
James Mooney, Aboriginal Population, 12-13.
James H. Bradley, “Affairs at Fort Benton," 225.
White, “The Winning of the West,” 328, 329.
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, 59.
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population falling to the disease, tribes were affected culturally as much as 
demographically/^ Social fragmentation was the natural result of sudden and 
dramatic population loss. For some bands of the Sioux and the Cheyenne, this 
social and cultural fragmentation combined with other factors, particularly the adoption 
of the horse, to cause these tribes to give up agriculture. For the Mandans and 
Hidatsas, other horticulturalists who refused to give up their sedentary lifestyle, 
disease had so whittled down their populations by 1838 that the two tribes were 
forced to combine in one village -  Like a Fishhook. Even among already nomadic 
groups, like the Blackfeet and Assiniboines, epidemics had a significant social and 
political impact, compelling decimated tribes to reorganize themselves.'®
Like all infections, smallpox reduced both the appetite and the ability of tribes 
to procure focxl in their debilitated condition.'® Such was the case at Fort Clark, 
where the trader Francis Chardon recorded that “although Cattle have been in 
Abundance all winter the Indians have not laid up a Morsel of dried Meat, They will 
starve before long as they have no Corn." The Mandans and Hidatsas, like many 
other tribes ravaged by disease, were too weak to harvest or hunt; starvation came 
to finish the fatal job smallpox had begun.^
Given the appalling attrition rates of most Upper Missouri tribes during the 
1837-38 smallpox outbreak, it would be reasonable to assume that the Upper 
Missouri fur trade declined as a result. In fact, just the opposite occurred. The 
season following the epidemic. Fort Mackenzie (later Fort Benton) saw 10,000 
robes traded -  a better return than any previous year. Three years later, not nearly 
enough time for tribes to replace their substantially depleted ranks, the number had 
improbably increased to 21,000 robes. James H. Bradley, commenting in the 
1870s, explained this post-epidemic increase in the robe trade as surviving Indians 
trading the robes of their many tribesmen who had fallen to smallpox. But the 
Upper Missouri robe returns remained much higher than pre-epidemic years for
Ann F. Ramenofsky, 7/je Arc/7aeo/ogy of European Confacf (Albuquerque; University of New 
Mexico, 1987), 160-61.
John C. Ewers, The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture, 320.
Shepard Krech III, Ecological Indian, 90-91.
“  Francis Chardon, Journal at Fort Clark, 152.
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over thirty years following the 1837-1838 outbreak -  certainly far longer than could 
be accounted for by the trade of the robes of the smallpox victims alone
The observations of Bradley and others, along with fur company records, 
amply demonstrate that nineteenth century epidemics, despite killing thousands of 
Plains Indians, did not seem to hinder the trade in bison goods. Why? By the 
1850s the indigenous population of the northern plains was roughly 42,000 souls -  
and, as historian Dan Flores has pointed out, this is a figure that excludes Rocky 
Mountain and village tribes who frequented the plains to hunt buffalo.^ Other 
scholars have conduded that native bison hunters, across the Great Plains, required 
approximately 6.5 bison a year to meet their subsistence needs.^ Twenty-five 
thousand bison hunting Indians of the northern plains died during the 1837-1838 
smallpox epidemic. For the most part these tribal population losses were never 
recovered in the nineteenth century. '̂* Subsequently roughly 156,000 bison were 
no longer required to meet the annual subsistence needs of shrunken post-epidemic 
tribal populations.
Does this mean that smallpox was the Indian's executioner and the bison’s 
savior? Not exactly. Before the smallpox outbreak in 1837 only about 25,000 
robes annually were traded on the Upper Missouri. By 1840 the number had 
dramatically increased to 100,000 and stayed there, with some notable exceptions, 
for the following thirty years. This substantial growth in the exchange of bison robes 
is an acknowledged and oft-cited fact by historians of the fur trade. Unfortunately, no
See chapter one.
“ Dan Flores, ‘The Great Contraction: Bison and Indians in Northern Plains Environmental 
History,” Legacy: New Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, (Helena: Montana 
Historical Society Press, 1996), 15. Flores bases his estimate of 42,000 bison hunting Indians 
primarily on the work of John C. Ewers in the footnotes of Edwin Thompson Denig’s, Five Indian 
Tribes of the Upper Missouri: Sioux, Arickaras, Assiniboines, Crees, Crows, ed. John C. Ewers 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961) and in Ewers’ own work The Blackfeet: Raiders on 
the Northwestern Plains (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 60, 212. The estimate 
falls into the population range for northern plains Indians given by other scholars and nineteenth 
century observers.
“  Dan Flores, ‘The Great Contraction”, 15. Flores bases his estimate of 6.5 bison per individual 
on the work of Bill Brown’s “Comancheria Demography, 1805-1830,” Panhandle-Plains Historicai 
Review, 59 (1986), 8-12 and H. Paul Thompson’s, “A Technique Using Anthropological and 
Biological Data,” Current Anthropology, 7 (October 1966) 417-24.
James Mooney, The Aborigional Population of America North of Mexico, 13.
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one has explained adequately why it happened, only that it did. One explanation, 
given by Lieutenant Bradley in the 1870s, while wild buffalo still inhabited the Plains, 
has already been noted: Bradley thought the robes of those Indians who died were 
traded by the survivors in the first few years following the smallpox epidemic. This, 
however, does not account for robe returns lasting well into the second half of the 
nineteenth century that were much higher than in pre-epidemic years. To address 
this, Bradley offered a second explanation that nearly all recent scholars echo: the 
inducements of the world market economy lured Plains tribes into hunting far more 
buffalo than they needed for subsistence alone. The 1840s, then, just happened to 
be the decade when tribes finally swallowed, after years of cautious nibbling, the 
bait of Western trade goods.
There may be more to the story, however. Bradley, while on the right track, 
too loosely tied the effects of smallpox to the expansion of the robe trade. If 
smallpox had killed the fur trade like it did Upper Missouri tribes, as many as
156.000 buffalo might have been spared annually. These were bison that the
25.000 Upper Missouri Indians who perished in the epidemic would have 
harvested just to meet their basic needs for living a year on the unforgiving Plains.
But the fur trade did not die, in fact it flourished, following the epidemic.
Although Western trade goods undoubtedly were alluring to indigenous 
hunters, they needed buffalo to get them. Prior to the epidemic, northern plains 
tribes were, primarily, subsistence hunters: as many as 67,000 Indians probably 
killed 400,000 buffalo, but traded only 25,000 robes -  which translates to roughly 
sixteen percent of the total robes taken. Given the size of the historic Northern 
Plains herd (perhaps as many as 5,600,000 animals), only 200,000 bison could be 
killed without exceeding the natural increase of bison.® Tribes, then, were pushing 
the sustainability envelope of their bison hunting lifestyle just to meet their basic 
needs, let alone actively engage in the fur trade. Prior to the 1837 smallpox 
outbreak there simply may not have been enough buffalo, or time to procure them, 
beyond what was needed for subsistence to allow Indian hunters to participate in the
“  Flores, ‘The Great Contraction,” 15; William A. Dobak, ‘‘Killing the Canadian Buffalo 1821- 
1881,” Western Historical Quarterly 27 (Spring 1996): 36.
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fur trade on anything other than a small scale.
This changed when smallpox hit. The epidemic left Upper Missouri tribes 
with far fewer mouths to feed and a northern buffalo herd far less taxed by the 
subsistence needs of these same tribes. Along with leaving thousands dead, 
smallpox may have left gaps in the traditional and material cultures of Northern Tribes 
that were filled by an increased reliance on Western trade goods. Nothing could 
have been better for the fur trade. Indian hunters, their tribal roles depleted by 
disease, could devote more energy to robe production for market rather than for 
subsistence use. This is exactly what northern tribes did, increasing the number of 
robes they traded by as much as 75,000 more in the post-epidemic years. This 
increase in market hunting by tribes, then, cut into the 156,000 post-epidemic 
decrease in annual subsistence hunting by almost half.
Given that Indian market hunting on the Northern Plains never exceeded 
much more than 100,000 robes, and was often far less, and that indigenous 
populations never really recovered from their population losses resulting from the 
1837-1838 epidemic, a net decrease in bison mortality from native hunting occurred 
after 1838.^ While the market and subsistence hunting of nineteenth century tribes 
after 1840 exceeded acceptable limits for the long term viability of bison on the 
Northern Plains, bison were still better off than a decade earlier when a much larger 
indigenous population was hunting primarily to meet their basic needs. The rise of
“  The population of a number of northern tribes were decimated again in subsequent outbreaks 
of disease. In 1848, the Northern Shoshones contracted smallpox, who then passed it along to 
the Crows. A fierce cholera epidemic swept the Plains in 1849-1850, which was particularly 
devastating to tribes of the Southern and Central plains. In 1856 smallpox once more traveled up 
the Missouri and wiped out tjetween 2,000 and 3,000 Indians -  mainly Arikaras, Hidatsas, and 
Crows. Some might make the argument that a growing number of Sioux on the Northern Plains -  
through a high birth and low (relative to other tribes) mortality rate, and migration west by eastern 
bands -  made up for the population losses of other tribes hard hit by disease in the late 1830s. 
This does not appear to be the case. While estimates by white observers at the time are decidedly 
shaky, the Sioux population on the Northern Plains seems to have reached roughly 25,000, their 
population in the 1850s and 1860s, at approximately the time of, or shortly after, the 1837-1838 
smallpox epidemic. See E. Wagner Steam and Allan E. Steam, The Effect of Smallpox on the 
Destiny of the Amerindian {Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1945),85-86, 97*99; Alfred Cumming, 
Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1856, H. exdoc. I, (Serial 
893), 624; Warren, Preliminary Report of Explorations in Nebraska and Dakota, 51; J. W. Denver, 
Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 1 st Sess., 1857, H. exdoc. 2, (Serial 
942), 292; White, ‘The Winning of the West," 330.
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Indian market hunting In the 1840s was not the beginning of the end for bison, but 
merely a continuation, on a lesser scale, of the over-exploitation of the animal.
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Chapter Five:
“When Everyone was at Peace...the Buffalo would Soon Disappear'" : 
Warfare and Bison Preservation on the Northern Plains
Warfare has long been a favorite theme of both historians and Hollywood 
filmmakers in portrayals of the historic West. But the impact of war on Western 
ecology has long been overlooked. This has begun to change. According to Paul 
Martin and Christine Szuter, the teeming herds of buffalo, elk, deer, and other 
mammals observed by early nineteenth century explorers along the Upper 
Missouri were not entirely “natural.” In fact, the multitudes of bison, deer, elk, and 
other wildlife that greeted the likes of Lewis and Clark were intensively shaped and 
manipulated by human action. This action, according to Martin and Szuter, took the 
form of intense intertribal warfare -  a fact of indigenous life on the plains for most of 
the nineteenth century and certainly centuries before. In the nineteenth century West, 
warfare had the interesting side effect of creating no-man’s lands between belligerent 
tribes. These buffer zones were too difficult for one tribe to control and too 
dangerous for people to enter with any security. Bison naturally congregated to 
these grassy havens where humans, horses, and arrows were few
Martin’s and Szuter’s hypothesis is not altogether new. Historical accounts are 
sprinkled with references to warfare and its effect on wildlife. TTie nineteenth century 
British explorer John Palliser, reporting on the plains drained by the Sasckatchewan
’ General Sam B. Steele, Forty Years in Canada (London, 1915),110, quoted in Frank Gilbert Roe, 
The Nor#i American Buffalo: A Critical Study of the Spec/eg in Its Wild State (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1951), 453.
^Paul S. Martin and Christine R. Szuter, “War Zones and Game Sinks in Lewis and Clark’s West,” 
Conservation Biology 13 (February 1999), 36-45. See also, Harold Nickerson, “The Virginia Deer 
and Intertribal Buffer Zones in the Upper Mississippi Valley," Man, Culture, and Animals: The Role 
of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments, A. Leeds and A. P. Vayda, eds. (Baltimore: Horn- 
Shafer Company, 1965); Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the 
Western Sioux in the Eighteentii and Nineteenth Centuries," Journal of American History 65 
(September 1978), 334-340; Elliot West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, & the 
Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 76-78, 255-56; Dan Flores, 
“Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” The Journal of 
American History 78 (September 1991), 465-485. For archaeological evidence of pre-contact 
indigenous warfare in the West see George C. Frison, Prehistoric Hunters of the High Plains (San 
Diego: Academic Press, Inc., 1991).
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river wrote, “[t]he abundance of game here is accounted for by its being the neutral 
ground of the Crees, Assineboines, and Blackfeet; none of these tribes are in the 
habit of resorting to its neighbourhood except In war parties.”  ̂ One indigenous 
observation coming from the early nineteenth century Is that of Herosche, a Konza 
chief, made while addressing his enemies the Otoes, Missouries, and lowas: “My 
Friends! We wish for peace, and we are tired of war; there is a large tract of country, 
intervening between us, from which, as it Is so constantly traversed by our 
respective hostile parties, we cannot either of us kill the game in security, to furnish 
our traders with peltries."" An intrepid Canadian, General Sam Steele, clearly 
identified the impact of war on western wildlife: “...peace, rather than war” was the 
greater threat to buffalo; “when everyone was at peace with his neighbor and could 
go where he liked, the buffalo would soon disappear...”®
Martin and Szuter limit their analysis of Northern Plains buffer zones 
predominantly to the early nineteenth century and the journals of the Corps of 
Discovery. How much further in time can their martial ecological theory be taken? A 
perusal of the documents indicates that the lands adjacent and between the Upper 
Missouri and Yellowstone rivers, at least in part, remained highly contested and rich 
in bison until the very end of the hide hunt in the early 1880s. But Martin’s and 
Szuter’s argument must be approached with caution. Their hypothesis potentially 
reduces complex ecological and cultural processes to a simplified causal relationship 
between indigenous warfare and plentiful wildlife. Their argument also raises the 
question of what even constitutes a "natural " ecosystem, and whether humans can 
be included in it. As the nineteenth century progressed the dynamics of intertribal 
warfare changed. The technology, tactics, role and power of various tribes involved 
in plains conflict evolved and changed over time due to a wide array of factors, and 
these changes affected. In some cases dramatically, the environment(s) of which
 ̂ Irene M. Spry (ed.), The Papers of the Palliser Expedition: 1857-1860 (Toronto: The Champlain 
Society, 1968), 146 with more discussion of “neutral grounds” on 143.
" Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed.. Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, Vol. 15 ( Cleveland, 1904-1907), 
106.
^General Sam B. Steele, Forty Years in Canada (London, 1915),110, quoted in Frank Gilbert Roe, 
The North American Buffalo: A Cri^cal Study of the Species in Its Wild State (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1951), 453.
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northern tribes were a part.
Warfare provided an important cultural mechanism with which tribes cognized 
the landscape around them. It dictated, in part, how tribes understood and related to 
each other and the animals they hunted. Not surprisingly, both the act of hunting and 
of war made similar social and technological requirements of their participants. The 
weapons, horse skills, rules of engagement, and ceremonialism used by Plains 
Indians were very similar for both pursuits. Warfare and hunting were major sources 
of indigenous cultural identity, particularly for men, and provided the primary means 
of social mobility in the relatively egalitarian, though not entirely unstratified, tribal 
societies. Indeed, the two pursuits went hand in hand -  hunting often led to war, and 
war was often waged to allow tribes to hunt.
The brush of history, until quite recently, has painted the nineteenth century 
Plains -  an important stage for both indigenous hunting and war -  as a veritable 
paradise. In 1820, Stephen H. Long noted that the “...whole of this region seems 
peculiarly adapted as a range for buffaloes, wild goats, and other wild game, 
incalculable multitudes of which find ample pasturage and subsistence upon it.”®
This view was first established by the awe-struck accounts of the first white explorers 
in the region, particularly Lewis and Clark. In an exceedingly flowery example,
Lewis, describing the plains drained by the lower Marias river, says the area is one 
of “...the most beautifully picturesque countries that I ever beheld, through the wide 
expanse of which, innumerable herds of living animals are seen it’s borders 
garnished with one continued garden of roses, while it’s lofty and open forrests are 
the habitation of miriads of the feathered tribes who salute the ear of the passing 
traveler with their wild and simple, yet s[w]eet and cheerfull melody.”  ̂ Whether the 
“Innumerable herds” present on the nineteenth century Norfriern Plains were actually 
a natural phenomenon independent of human influence has been a question long 
neglected by scholars, and is only recently receiving some academic light by the
® Long’s statement is quoted In Hiram M. Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far West: A 
History of Pioneer Trading Posts & Early fur Companies of the t^issouri Valley & Rocky Mountains 
& of the Overland Commerce with Santa Fe, 2 vols. (New York: The Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 
1935), 578.
' This statement by Lewis is taken from his June 8th, 1805 entry. See Bernard DeVoto, The 
Journals of Lewis and Clark (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
likes of Martin and Szuter and others.
There does seem to be a link between indigenous warfare and the sizable 
animal populations of Upper Missouri grasslands.® However, the innumerable 
animals of the Northern Plains that Martin and Szuter associate with indigenous 
conflict simply would not have been there, warfare or not, if the ecosystem had not 
been able to support such a substantial biomass. The wildlife implications of 
indigenous warfare combined with a diverse and healthy ecosystem on the Northern 
Plains to make the region one of the most, and by the mid-eighteen seventies the 
most, bountiful bison ranges in the West.
Douglass Bamforth has argued that Northern Plains grasslands, including the 
area encapsulated by warring Upper Missouri tribes, consistently provided the most 
abundant habitat for buffalo. This contradicte a number of ethnographic accounts that 
long held the Southern Plains as the better buffalo range. William T. Hornaday 
believed that “...although the northern herd ranged over such an immense area, it 
was numerically less than half the size of the overwhelming multitude which actually 
crowded the southern range.” But this traditional view, according to Bamforth, is 
entirely unsupported by evidence. He finds a general trend, for both historic and 
pre-contact buffalo, whereby the animal's population and density decreased as one 
moved southwestward from the northeastern plains of North Dakota to the 
southwestern plains of the Texas panhandle. Overall, ttie Northern Plains had a 
higher annual precipitation, milder summer temperatures, less fluctuation in climatic 
trends, as well as more consistent and longer growth patterns for grasses than the 
plains further south -  all factors that promoted northern bison herds that would have 
been “larger, more densely distributed, less mobile overall, and more regular in their
® Clark Wissler, Tihe American Indian (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), v. Douglass 
Bamforth makes a similar, though updated and refined, version of Wissler’s argument in Ecology 
and Human Organization on the Great Plains (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).
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movements.” ®
The temporal, cultural, and ecological landscape described by Martin and 
Szuter was the result of a combination of human and ecological processes. On a 
material level, the debatable zone of the Upper Missouri in the early nineteenth 
century existed in part because of the technological equilibrium and social alliances 
among the tribes surrounding it. By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth 
century all Northern Plains tribes had at least some horses while at the same time 
European traders and their posts were becoming more common on the Northern 
Plains and in the Rockies. Subsequently, western tribes-primarily the Salish, 
Kootenais, Pend Oreilles and Nez Perce -  who for a number of years had lacked 
access to the firepower acquired by their enemies via the fur trade, were able to 
obtain a moderate amount of guns and ammunition. At the same time, tribes farther 
east on the Upper Missouri plains, particularly the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras, 
also acquired guns through trade. A number of these early nineteenth century 
indigenous groups, long pressed by the Blackfeet from the west and the Sioux from 
the east -  who had access to European trade longer than many northern tribes -  
suddenly found themselves in a better position, not only to defend themselves, but 
also to go on the offensive and carve out a piece of the northern hunting grounds for 
themselves. °
The importance of guns to the Salish and other mountain tribes is reflected in 
this comment by Cartier, a chief of the Salish, to David Thompson in 1810: “...You
® Douglass Bamforth, Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1987), 67, 74, 78; William T. Hornaday, “The Extermination of hte American Bison, with 
a Sketch of its Discovery and Life History,” Smithsonian Report, 1887 (Washington, 1889), Part 
II, 503-4; Using the severe drought of the 1930s as a basis of analysis, Robert T. Coupland 
demonstrates that during widespread drought grasslands are affected less from south to north; 
meaning that the northern plains tended to provide a more stable grassland for ungulates during 
sharp large scale climatic shifts. See Coupland, “The Effects of Fluctuations in Weather upon the 
Grasslands of the Great Plains,” The Botanical Review, XXIV (May 1958), 311. For a brief 
discussion of north-south climatic gradiants see John A. Harrington, Jr. and Jay R. Harman, 
“Climate and Vegetation in Central North America: Natural Patterns and Human Alt^ations,"Great 
Plains Quarterly 11 (Spring 1991), 107.
For a discussion on the diffusion of horses and firearms across the Plains see Frank Raymond 
Secoy, Changing Military Patterns of the Great Plains Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992); For the importance of horses in promoting indigenous warfare see David 
Thompson, David Thompson’s Journals Relating to Montana and Adjacent Regions, 1808-1812, 
M. Catherine White, ed. (Missoula: Montana State University Press, 1950), lii.
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are well aware when you go to hunt the Bison, we also prepare for war with the 
Peeagans and their allies; if we had ammunition we should already have been there, 
for the Cow bisons are now all fat, but we cannot go with empty Guns: we do not 
fear War, but we wish to meet our enemies well armed...””  By 1805, even the 
Crow, one of the more remote tribes along the Yellowstone, saw their access to 
firearms increase with the trading trip of Francois-Antoine Larocque. In the eastern 
plains, the Sioux took advantage of their early access to firearms, via their connection 
with eastern woodland European trade, and forcefully entered the plains in the mid­
eighteenth century. This began a process of plains conquest, according to Richard 
White, that would rival that of the British and Americans for over a century.
While the war potential of many northern tribes during the first three decades 
of the nineteenth century was balanced by the access most of them had to guns and 
horses, numerical inequalities between belligerent tribes were compensated for by 
the formation of alliances: one between the Salish, Kootenais, upper Pend Oreilles 
and Nez Perce; another between the Assiniboines and Plains Cree; still another, and 
one of the most powerful, composed of the Piegans, Bloods, Blackfoot, and Gros 
Ventres; and an alliance between the Mandans and Hidatsas, which the Arikaras 
sporadically joined throughout the early nineteenth century. Another peace made in 
1825 between allied bands of the Sioux and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
became one of the most important indigenous alliances in Plains history. The 
common thread running through all of these alliances is that tribes joined them 
primarily to better their ability to hunt buffalo In the face of their enemies. Although 
the Sioux alliance was astonishingly successful in conquering much of the plains, it 
was never able to wrest fully the rich hunting grounds between the Upper Missouri
" Thompson, David Thompson's Journals Relating to Montana and Adjacent Regions, 3.
Ibid., 59, 63; Francols-Antoine Larocque, “Journal of a Voyage to the Rocky Mountains from My 
Leaving the Assinibois river on the 2nd June, 1805,” The Journal of Larocque (Fairfield: Ye 
Galleon Press, 1981). A particularly important article to this thesis, and to historiography on plains 
warfare and the Sioux, is Richard V /̂hite’sTh e  Winning of the West: The Expansion of the 
Western Sioux in the eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in Journal of American History LXV 
(September, 1978), 319-343; John C. Fremont, Narrative of the Exploring Expedition to the 
Rocky Mountains in the Year 1842; and to Oregon and North California in the years 1843-44 
(London, 1906), 21-2.
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and Yellowstone rivers from the other northern tribes who hunted there.
Interestingly, though the aforementioned are all significant rapprochements, 
there was never a comprehensive alliance between all, or even most, of the 
principle Northern Plains trit)es. This is strikingly different from what occurred on the 
Southern Plains. In 1840 a grand alliance was formed between the previously 
warring tribes of the Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowa- 
Apaches. For well over a decade these tribes had been killing one another for 
control of the plentiful Southern Plains hunting grounds. As in the north, this warfare 
promoted buffer zones in the Southern Plains that limited tribal hunting and provided 
some protection for southern bison herds. With the transfer of eastern tribes to the 
west side of the Mississippi during the 1830s a new competitor was introduced to 
the struggle over Southern Plains hunting grounds. The 1840 peace was made, in 
part, to keep these eastern tribes off the plains. The peace also brought a more 
favorable situation for white traders and gave western tribes better access to 
firearms and other trade goods. Despite its benefits to the tribes involved, the 
ecological consequences of the peace were dire. Without the threat of war to keep 
them out, Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowa-Apaches 
exploited the bison resources of the area with far less restraint. Subsequently, more 
buffalo were killed and the southern herds were pushed eastward into a new buffer 
between eastern and western tribes.
Intertribal and Indian/United States warfare continued unabated on the 
Northern Plains until the 1880s. Regardless of shifting tribal boundaries and 
fluctuations in tribal power across the Plains, much of the Upper Missouri and 
Yellowstone grasslands remained contested ground for most of the nineteenth 
century. While hunting grounds east of the Missouri and south of the Platte were 
being disrupted by American and Sioux expansion, hunting grounds west of the 
Missouri were partially stabilized by buffer zones that had been established by the
Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the Plains: A Study of Cultural Development among 
North American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 82-84; Secoy, Changing 
Military Patterns of the Great Plains Indians, 63.
Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy,” 482-483; Elliott West, The Contested 
Plains, 192.
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time of Lewis and Clark.
The ecological impact of these war-induced buffers is reflected in the accounts 
of the Corps of Discovery in the early nineteenth century. As the fifty-man 
contingent led by Lewis and Clark journeyed northwestward from St. Louis, Lewis 
recorded that a variety of wildlife was plentiful from the junction of the Missouri with 
the Mississippi river. However, he made it clear that buffalo were not seen in 
significant numbers until the party reached the Sioux river, near present day 
Vermilion, South Dakota. From there to Fort Mandan, ‘the buffalo, elk and deer 
increase in great quantity.” From the time they left Fort Mandan until they reached the 
Shoshone at Lemhi Pass, the Corps of Discovery saw no people, but an amazing 
quantity of wildlife. Only in the established hunting grounds of the Mandans and 
Hidatsas, and in the heart of the Badlands, did the group meet with any scarcity of 
wild animals. The explorers recorded an “abundance of wild game, especially 
buffalo, elk and deer, the animals often tame and easily dispatched. "̂
This wildlife paradise was surrounded and in part created by warring tribes -  
including the Mandans, Hidatsas, Arikaras, Assiniboins, Blackfeet, Shoshones, 
Bannocks, Crows, Kootenais, Rend Oreilles, Salish, and bands of the Blackfeet and 
Sioux. Captain William Clark wrote; “I have observed that in the country between 
the nations which are at war with each other the greatest numbers of wild animals are 
to be found.”’® Upon reaching the Rocky Mountains, wildlife decreased and west of 
the range almost none was to be found at all. Martin and Szutzer demonstrate the 
ecological continuity of the grasslands east and west of the Rockies, but note that the 
western tribes were at peace and their lands were virtually devoid of wildlife.
Without the prohibitive hunting consequences of a war zone, the substantial human 
population sandwiched along the Columbia drainage between the Cascades and 
Rockies over hunted the region. Agreeing with a number of recent conservation
The letter, dated Fort Mandan, March 31, 1805, is quoted in Ruben Gold Thwaites, A Brief 
History of Rocky Mountain Exploration (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1904), 119; Martin 
and Szuter, “War Zones and Game Sinks,” 38-40.
Garry E. Moulton, The Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 11 volumes (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1983-1997) from the journal entry of 16 September 1804; Martin 
and Szuter distinguish this quote in their article, see “War Zones and Game Sinks in Lewis and 
Clark’s West,” 42-44.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
biologists and anthropologists, Martin and Szuter believe many indigenous 
subsistence hunters to have been highly opportunistic in their hunting strategies.
The two authors contend that contrary to the environmentalist label often ascribed 
Native Americans, many tribes were fully capable of seriously altering their 
environments. Nevertheless, warfare can, and on the nineteenth century Northern 
Plains did, minimize the potency of human predation and maintain animal populations 
in core areas.
An 1825 expedition to the Yellowstone, led by General Henry Atkinson and 
Major Benjamin O’Fallon, was sent with the task of putting an end to the rampant 
intertribal warfare in the Upper Missouri region and lessoning the animosity of some 
tribes toward the United States. Northern tribes, particularly the Blackfeet and 
Arikaras, had shown a vehement hostility toward the Americans since the War of 
1812, and in some cases earlier. In 1824 Congress passed an act authorizing 
treaties with the Missouri tribes. United States representatives held council with the 
Poncas, Jetons, Yanktons, Yanktonais, Cheyennes, Arikaras, Mandans, Hidatsas, 
and Crows; the Blackfeet and Assiniboines were the only two tribes the expedition 
had planned to but failed to meet. Bison, bears, deer, various birds, and other 
creatures of the plains were a constant sight all along the Upper Missouri, but 
became particularly plentiful upon reaching the Yellowstone -  the beginning of the 
region bordered by the most tribes. Promoting access to this rich Upper Missouri 
bison range by the increasingly profitable fur trade was one primary impetus for the 
expedition. Although Altkinson’s and O’Fallon’s mission went smoothly, it did little to 
curb intertribal rivalries and bloodshed. The continually turbulent nature of the Upper 
Missouri before and after the Yellowstone expedition of 1825 is evidenced by the 
conflict in the lands surrounding the sedentary villages of the Mandans and 
Hidatsas.'̂
The latter tribes were feeling the expansionist pressure of the Yanktonai
DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, 437-40; Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the 
Far West, Vol. 2, 602-611; Roger L. Nichols, The Missouri Expedition, 1818'1820; The Journal of 
Surgeon John Gale with Related Documents (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969),
1109; Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri, John 0 . Ewers, ed. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 56-57
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Sioux even at the time of Lewis and Clark. Although the Arikaras to the south of the 
Mandan-Hidatsa villages occasionally joined the latter tribes to fend off the Sioux, by 
1832 the Arikaras had been forced further afield by the Yanktonais. With the 
Arikaras gone, the Mandans and Hidatsas composed the bastion preventing the 
Sioux from taking complete control of the Upper Missouri to Fort Union. Despite 
facing a much larger force of Yanktonai and Yankton Sioux warriors, the Mandans and 
Hidatsas were not bested by the latter until 1838, following the devastating 
smallpox epidemic of the previous year.
Throughout this period, hunting the still rich buffalo country surrounding the 
Mandan and Hidatsas was a dangerous endeavor. The observations of Francis A. 
Chardon, the derk at Fort Clark for much of the 1830s, reflects this. Chardon’s 
description of one outing -  “[wjent out hunting, saw enemies, and returned” -  is 
typical. On another occasion he wrote that a large party of Mandans went on a hunt 
and successfully killed a “quantity” of buffalo cows, only to abandon the meat when 
they “saw enemies” on the way back to their village. During the difficult winter of 
1836-1837 buffalo were only thirty miles from Fort Clark, yet though they were 
starving, the Mandans refused to leave. According to Chardon, "Fear Makes them 
Keep at home.” In March, 1837, the Mandans finally submitted to the call of hunger 
and went to kill buffalo, reported in abundance forty miles from Fort Clark, but “fear 
overtook them on the way” and they returned starving and empty handed.’®
But the Mandans and Hidatsas were not to be taken lightly. Indeed, the 
Yanktonais feared the horticulturalists enough to move their village up the Heart river 
in February, 1837 to get away from the two tribes. The Yanktonais had good 
reason to be cautious. In 1836, in a state of near starvation, the tribe went north in 
search of buffalo. Along the way they stole some corn from the Mandans and 
Hidatsas. The latter sent chase the next morning and decimated the Sioux 
encampment, killing at least 150 and taking forty-three women and children prisoner.
On Prince Maximilian’s visit to Fort Clark in 1833 and 1834, Toussaint Charbonneau,
F. A. Chardon, Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 1834-1839: Descriptive of Life on the Upper 
Missouri; of a Fur Trader’s Experiences Among the Mandans, Gros Ventres, and Their Neighbors; 
of the Ravages of the SmaU-Pox Epidemic of 1837, Annie Heloise Abel, ed. (Pierre; Lawrence K. 
Fox, Department of History, State of South Dakota, 1932), 6, 35.
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still alive thirty years after his journey west with the Lewis and Clark expedition, 
observed that despite Sioux harassment, the Mandans and Hidatsas often bested 
their adversaries in battle.’®
By the late 1830s buffalo were becoming scarce on the lower reaches of the 
Missouri. Upriver, the horticultural tribes kept up a successful resistance to Sioux 
;3 advances and buffalo remained in sizeable numbers in a contested zone between
^  =orts Pierre and Union. North and west of Fort Clark the Mandans and Hidatsas
g  ^  ought over hunting grounds predominantly with the Assiniboines and Plains Cree.
^  ’he land south of Fort Clark to Fort Pierre roughly corresponded to the region fought
y  % )r by the village horticulturalists and the Yanktonais and Yanktons.
^  ^  TTie impact of this conflict on wildlife is reflected in Chardon s record of an
- U  r - '
^ - Driver trip taken in 1838. Returning to Fort Clark from Fort Pierre, Chardon saw
^  ^  try few Indians in this war zone but an abundance of buffalo, antelope, deer and
2 . ^  -4. 1er animals on his way up the Missouri. Elsewhere in his journal, Chardon’s entries
 ̂p  3 repeatedly punctuated by references to war parties of Sioux, Assiniboines, and
^  ?e, who consistently threatened the Mandans and Hidatsas his post served. But
^  o  < il the late-1830s, there was no clear victor in this battle over hunting grounds and
Mandans and Hidatsas held their own against their many enemies.®
Following a devastating smallpox epidemic in 1837-1838, the dynamics of 
intertribal warfare, and subsequently the dynamics of tfie hunting grounds on the 
Upper Missouri east and south of Fort Union, changed considerably. In the fall of 
1837 Jacob Halsey, a trader for the American Fur Company, noted that although 
buffalo were plentiful in the area, there were few Indians left to hunt them. 
Interestingly, the epidemic did not hurt the fur producing capacity for trade of Upper 
Missouri Indians, but did significantly reduce the number of buffalo killed for 
subsistence by northern tribes.®’
'® Fulkerson to Clark, 1 Oct. 1835, Upper Missouri Superintendency, Letters Received, Records 
of the Office of Indian Affairs; Alexander Philip Maximilian (Prince of Wied Neuwied), Travels in the 
interior of Nortii America, Vols. XXIII, 230-2; XXIV, 13-14, 54, of Early Western Travels, 1748- 
1846, Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed. (32 vols, Cleveland, 1904-1907).
“ Chardon, Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 171.
See chapter nine, footnote twelve.
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The consequences of disease on the balance of tribal power were significant. 
The stationary and confined village environs in which the horticultural tribes lived 
provided ideal conditions for the spread of illness. That only twenty-three Mandan 
men, forty women, and sixty children were left standing at the end of the epidemic 
bears testiment to this. On the other hand, equestrian nomads like the Sioux, with a 
more loosely organized social structure and a shifting demographic, presented a less 
favorable environment for the transfer of disease. In speaking of the Sioux, who had 
not yet succumbed in any great numbers to the epidemic, Jacob Halsey wrote"...we 
hope the disease will not be so fatal as with their neighbors.” His hope was fulfilled; 
comparatively the Yanktons and Yanktonais suffered much less from the 1837 
outbreak than other northern tribes. In addition to a more epidemic-resistant social 
structure, many Sioux had heeded the warning given by Missouri Indian agent, 
Joshua Pilcher, to stay away from the smallpox infested trading posts. Furthermore, 
Richard White believes the domination of the Missouri trade route by the Yanktons, 
Yanktonais, and Saone Tetons helped these tribes to weather the storm of disease. 
In 1832 the Office of Indian Affairs sent doctors up the Missouri to vaccinate tribes 
met along the way. The Sioux were the first Indians the doctors met with and over a 
thousand Yanktonais were vaccinated. Lacking the funds to bring the vaccine farther 
upriver, the noble project ended in giving the Sioux a biological edge over their less
immune enemies.^
Human disease had an indirect, yet profound, Impact on Northern Plains 
ecology. Following the scourge of smallpox the remnants of the Mandans, 
Hidatsas, and Arikaras fled the Sioux and moved farther up the Missouri river, finally
“  Preston Holder, The Hoe and the Horse on the Plains: A Study of Cultural Development among 
North American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 84-85; Halsey to Pratte, 
Choteau & Co., 395; Richard White, “The Winning of the West," 328-329; J. Pilcher to Wm. Clark, 
Feb. 27, 1838, July 3, 1838, and Sept. 12, 1838, Upper Missouri Superintendency, Letters 
Received, Records of the Office of Indian Affairs. In reference to horticultural trit>es of the 
Missouri, Thadeus Culbertson related: “because they live in villages and in these mud houses 
they are more exposed to the epidemic and again their enemies always know where to find them 
and lurking about kill them when working in their fields...while these [horticulturalists] have 
decreased the Sioux, a wandering people, have greatly increased. Their mode of life giving them 
advantages of all the particulars mentioned as being disadvantageous for the others.” See 
Culbertson, Journal of an Expedition to the Mauvaises Terres and the Upper Missouri in 1850 
(Washington, 1851), 102.
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ending up at Fort Berthold in the early 1850s. After the horticultural tribes were 
decimated by disease, the Sioux effectively took control of the Upper Missouri to 
Fort Union. With intertribal competition nullified, the buffalo herds were quickly hunted 
out and pushed west of the Missouri. By the 1840s buffalo were virtually gone from 
grasslands east of the river. The story was much the same further south along the 
Missouri. Below the Yanktonais and Yanktons, the Oglala and Brule Sioux had 
pushed southwestward of the Missouri into the Black hills and Powder river country 
of the Crow. When the smallpox epidemic hit, these Sioux bands, and the Crow 
as well, were well away from the Missouri disease corridor and lost few of their 
number to the illness.^
Farther west, the area surrounding the Three Forks of frie Missouri, the Judith 
Basin, and lands to the north drained by the Sun, Teton, and Marias rivers, now 
became an even more highly contested hunting grounds -  primarily between the 
Crows, Shoshones, Bannocks, Salish, Kootenais, Pend Oreilles, Nez Perce, 
Assiniboines, and the four allied tribes of the Blackfeet confederacy. In 1805, Lewis 
noted that the Shoshones, Salish, Nez Perce and other western tribes journeyed 
from the Rocky Mountains onto the plains “at the risk of their lives.” The Three Forks 
of the Missouri was an important meeting place for these mountain and Columbia 
river peoples, where they could boost their numlDers and increase their chances of a 
successful hunt on the dangerous western buffalo range. Unfortunately, the Three 
Forks also provided a not-infrequent stage for bloody clashes between these tribes 
and their enemies. John Colter, an early trapper and one-time member of the 
Corps of Discovery, discovered this to his dismay in 1808 while traveling with a 
party of Salish. The latter tribe, numbering close to 800 with the addition of some 
friendly Crows, was set upon by a party of 1500 Blackfeet. Significantly, Colter’s 
participation in the battle on the side of the Salish further eroded the already poor
^ J.N.B. Hewitt, Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri, Forty-sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, 1928-9 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1930), 462; White, 
“The Winning of the West.” 329.
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Blackfeet relationship with the Americans. '̂*
Much like the Sioux to the east, the Blackfeet were a painful and persistent 
thorn in the side of most western tribes for much of the nineteenth century. War 
between the Blackfeet, Salish, Kootenais, Pend Oreilles, Nez Perce, Shoshones, 
and Bannocks was so severe that the entrance to the Blackfoot river corridor leading 
mountain tribes onto the buffalo plains was called “Hell’s Gate.” The Blackfeet were 
firmly possessive of the plentiful Upper Missouri hunting grounds and did their best 
to restrict all access -  of both whites and other tribes -  to these lands. Just before 
his trip along the Yellowstone to the Rockies, the fur trader John Work reflected: “I 
escaped with my scalp last year. I doubt whether I shall be so fortunate this trip.”*  
The smallpox epidemic that aided the Sioux in their play for northern hunting 
grounds loosened the Blackfeet’s grip on them. Ironically, the Blackfeet’s desire to 
protect their hunting grounds ultimately limited their ability to do so by bringing the 
destructive disease to the tribe. Alexander Culbertson, the trader at Fort McKenzie 
on the Marias river, tried and failed to prevent the Blackfeet from coming into the 
infected post to trade. The tribe wanted to get hold of a crucial shipment of guns to 
be used in Blackfeet excursions against the Salish and Crows. As a result, the 
Blackfeet, Piegans, and Gros Ventres were devastated. Although the Blackfeet 
remained a potent force after the devastating epidemic had gone, their less 
populous enemies -  particularly the Salish, Pend Oreilles, Nez Perce, Kootenais, 
and Crows -  weathered the epidemic more successfully and faced better odds in 
war against the dramatically reduced tribe. Americans, too, benefited from the 
outbreak of disease among the Blackfeet. The latter tribe, seeing the epidemic as a 
judgment against their violent actions toward the whites, lost much of their previous
Chittendon, The American Fur Trade, 838, 841 ; DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, 
August 19, 1805 entry; Stallo Vinton, John Colter Discoverer of Yellowstone Park: An Account of 
His Exploration in 1807 and of His further Adventures as Hunter; Trapper; Indian Fighter; 
Pathfinder; and Member of the Lewis and Clark Expedition (New York: Edward Eberstadt, 1926), 
79. Francois Laroque at about the same time as Lewis, noted the danger of traveling in the 
Yellowstone country and recorded the uneasiness of the Crow he was traveling with. The area 
abounded in game but there was considerable fear of attack among the group. See Laroque, The 
Journal of Francois Laroque, 57-59.
“  John Work, The Journal of John \Nork, 67.
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animosity toward the Americans.^
Most northern tribes exploited the buffalo as much as they were able to, but
the Sioux posed the most significant ecological threat to the hunting grounds.
Despite gaining almost complete control of the Northern and Central plains stretching
diagonally from western Minnesota southwestward to the White and Niobrara rivers,
then northward through the Black Hills and up to Fort Union, the Sioux gained only a
limited foothold in the bison-rich Montana interior. This is significant, because buffalo
were fairly quickly wiped out in lands that did come under the firm hegemony of
Sioux tribes. Colonel Richard Irving Dodge illustrated the ecological consequences
of both intertribal warfare and Sioux conquest:
the vast plains watered by the Niobrara and White Rivers, became a 
debatable ground into which none but war parties ever 
penetrated...Immense numbers of buffalo took refuge in this 
debatable land, where they were comparatively unmolested , when 
the Pawnees were finally overthrown, and forced onto a reservation, 
the Sioux poured into this Country...and finding buffalo very plenty 
and a ready sale for their robes, made such a furious onslaught on the 
poor beasts, that in a few years, scarce a buffalo could be found.
With competition nullified, the Sioux quickly stripped the area of its animal
resources.^
Such was the case all along the Upper Missouri when the grasslands 
surrounding it came under Sioux control in the nineteenth century. Buffalo became 
scarce and the Sioux pushed further westward. In 1855, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs George Manypenny lamented that animals had all but abandoned the lands 
of the Sioux, along with the traders. Even in 1832, it seems clear that wildlife was 
being hunted and pushed out along the Missouri in areas of the plains that fell into 
Sioux hands. Prince Maximilian of Weid, journeying up the Missouri in 1832, noted 
that “wild beasts and other animals, whose skins are valuable in the fur trade, have 
already diminished greatly in number along this river,” furtfier positing that in ten years 
the animals would be all but gone. He also recorded that bison were “yearly
Bernard Devoto, Across the Wide Missouri {Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), 279-301 ; 
David Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 68; Chittendon, The American Fur Trade of 
the Far West, 617-18;
•"Richard Irving Dodge, The Plains of North America and Their Inhabitants, Wayne R. Kime, ed. 
(Newark: University of Deleware Press, 1989), 147.
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decreasing and driven further inland.” The section of plains Maximilian described had 
been rich in wildlife and an intertribally contested area at the time of Lewis and Clark’s 
passage, but had since come, or was coming, under the control of the Sioux.^
When Maximilian left Fort Union and headed further upriver into a hunting 
ground still violently contested by the Assiniboine, Cree, Blackfeet, Crow, and 
Sioux, his party met with the vast numbers of animals described by Lewis and 
Clark. Leaving the mouth of the Yellowstone behind, Maximilian and company had 
a field day killing a copious number of animals with reckless abandon. The hunting 
was phenomenal throughout the journey, other than in the Badlands. Not 
surprisingly, Maximilian was hunting in an area fought for by several tribes.^
John C. Fremont observed that in 1843 the Sioux along the upper Missouri 
were in such dire straits from lack of buffalo that many of their “...villages...came over 
to the mountains at the heads of the Platte, in search of them. The rapid, 
progressive failure of their principal and almost their only means of subsistence has 
created great alarm among them,” and, according to Fremont, encouraged the 
creation of an alliance “...between the various tribes of the Sioux nation, the 
Cheyennes and Arapahoes... [to] make war against the Crow nation, in order to take 
from them their country, which is now the best buffalo country in the west.”^  The 
latter was eventually the course taken by the Sioux. However, in the 1840s the 
Sioux -  including the Yanktons, Yanktonais, and Tetons -  were far more focused on 
taking control of Pawnee, rather than Crow, hunting grounds. By 1847 the Sioux had 
forced the Pawnees south of the Platte and controlled much of the productive hunting 
grounds surrounding the river. Like other plains conflicts engaged in by the Sioux,
“  George Manypenny, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 1855- 
1866, H. exdoc. 1, 396-398; Maximillian, "Travels in the Interior of North America,"Vol. 22. 379. 
Although Maximilian’s prediction was more than thirty years off, it is a telling one nonetheless. 
Maximilian relates that at Council Bluffs, at the mouth of the Platte, the fur trade was virtually dead. 
See Ibid., 381.
“  Grizzly bears particularly fascinated the group, and many were killed. See Ibid, Vol. 23,43-44. A 
typical day of buffalo hunting saw the deaths of 12 buffalo, with the party bringing away “only the 
flesh of the cows [five of the twelve], leaving all the rest to the wolves, the bears, and the 
vultures.” Ibid, 47. This after Maximilian chastised other white hunters for their wanton waste of 
animals! See Ibid, Vol. 22, 382;
John C. Fremont, Narrative of the Exploring E>q)edition to the Rocky Mountains in the Year 
1842; and to Oregon and North California in the Years 1843-44 (London, 1846), 142.
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their wars with the Pawnees were fought more for buffalo than anything else. As 
soon as the once abundant Platte buffalo herds began to wane in the 1850s, the 
Sioux then aggressively turned their attention to the bountiful Yellowstone hunting 
grounds of the Crows.
By 1850, much of the Missouri drainage was more or less controlled by 
various Sioux tribes. In 1851, when the German artist Rudolph Friedrich Kurz 
headed up the Missouri, the Sioux occupied the lands extending westward beyond 
the Missouri to the Yellowstone and hunted south beyond the Arkansas River. At 
the same time, bison populations, or at least their range, had decreased across the 
Northern Plains. There was no sign of the animals anywhere along the Missouri in 
present day South Dakota, and at least one trading post, Fort Vermilion, had been 
abandoned. Kurz first saw buffalo a short distance below Fort Clark; the animals had 
declined considerably in number since Maximilian’s visit. After a stint at Fort 
Berthold, Kurz spent the winter at Fort Union, serving as derk to Edwin Denig. In the 
middle of March, 1852, Kurz joined a hunting party camped roughly twelve miles 
from the fort. TTiat the land t>etween Fort Union and now Fort Benton (which had 
replaced Fort McKenzie as the westernmost post on the Missouri) remained a highly 
contested hunting ground is made clear with this remark by Kurz: “If we fail to find 
sufficient game here to supply the fort with meat we shall remove our camp to a 
region on the other side [west] of the Yellowstone where, on account of frequent 
forays into that neighborhood by hostile Blackfeet, little hunting has been done.’”32
Harvey to Medill, 17 October 1847, St. Louis Superintendency, Letters Received, Records of 
the Office of Indian Affairs; Anthony McGinnis, Counting Coup and Cutting Horses: Intertribal 
Warfare on the Northern Plains, 1738-1889 (Evergreen: Cordillera Press, Inc., 1990), 82-83; 
Richard White, “The Winning of the West,” 338-39.
“  J.N.B. Hewitt, ed., “Journal of Rudolph Friederich Kurz; An Account of His Experiences Among 
Fur Traders and American Indians on the Mississippi and Upper Missouri Rivers During the Years 
1846 to 1852,” Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 115 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1937) footnote 10, 283; For decreasing bison in Eastern Dakota 
Territory see also Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri, John 0 . 
Ewers, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 36; Hewitt, Journal of Rudolph 
Friederich Kurz, 70; identifying the shrinking bison population Kurz exclaims: “Today for the first 
time I saw buffaloes. One hundred and eighty years ago they were still to be found in the State of 
Ohio! Good-by buffaloes, Indians, and fur companies.” Ibid, 72, 310; At one point Kurz 
mentioned that the large number of Indians in the vicinity of Fort Union makes for very poor 
hunting. He noted his fervent wish for heavy snow, which would keep the tribes away from the 
fort and subsequently allow game animals to wander closer, being easier to shoot. See ibid, 268.
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The plains cradling the Missouri in present day Montana remained a bloody 
war zone home to many bison until the early 1880s. Edwin Denig, commenting in 
the 1850’s, predicted that it would be the last Indian battleground -  and that it would 
be fought over the buffalo. Father Pierre Jean De Smet agreed. In 1851, De Smet 
described the same expanse and saw “...thousands of buffalo, the whole space 
between the Missouri and the Yellowstone was covered as far as eye could reach.” 
A few years earlier De Smet felt that “[t]he buffalo field is becoming narrower from 
year to year, and each succeeding hunt finds the Indians in closer contact...it is highly 
probable that the Blackfoot plains, from the Sascatshawin to the Yellow Stone, will 
be the last resort of the wild animals twelve years hense [sic].” In a similar vein, 
Alexander Ross believed that in 1850 “...Buffalo, the only inducement to the plains, 
are falling off fast. They are now like a ball between two players. The Americans are 
driving them north, the British south. The west alone will furnish them a last and 
temporary retreat...” In 1859 a Lakota chief told Indian agent, Thomas Twiss, that the 
Arapahos and Cheyennes “have no longer any hunting grounds” and that “before 
our children are grown up, we shall have no more game.” These were prophetic 
statements.^
“  Denig’s comment found in Anthony McGinnis, Coi/nf/ng Coup and Cutting Horses, 155; Pierre 
Jean DeSmet,"Letters and Sketches with a Narrative of a Year’s Residence among the Indian 
Tribes of the Rocky Mountains," Early Western Travels, 1746-1846 , Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed., 
Vol. 29 (32 vols., Cleveland, 1906), 365; Alexander Ross, The Red River Settlement (London, 
1856), 267; Quoted in Jeffrey Ostler, “’’They Regard Their Passing As Wakan”; Interpreting 
Western Sioux Explanations for the Bison’s Decline,” Western Historical Quarterly 30 (Winter 
1999), 483.
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Chapter Six:
To Claim the Northern Plains: The End to Buffer Zones and Buffalo
In an annual report to the Secretary of the Interior In 1849, Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Orlando Brown expressed his concern for the tribes living on the plains 
and in the mountains of the western interior. These tribes were beyond federal 
control and posed a significant threat to western American migration and settlement. 
For nineteenth-century bureaucrats like Brown, the difficulties surrounding the western 
tribes stemmed primarily from their hunting-based lifestyles. Western Indians, 
especially those most dependent on bison, did not fit into the sacred mold of 
Jeffersonian republicanism. For many Americans, living on the eve of the Industrial 
Revolution and Darwin’s theory of evolution, the lifestyles of many indigenous 
groups represented an anachronistic blemish on the face of American progress. 
According to Brown, the interior tribes had not been “induced to give up their natural 
habits of war and the chase. ”
Brown and other bureaucrats t)elieved -  accurately -  that declining bison 
populations led to bloodshed between tribes. Further, inroads into Indian country 
by white emigrants heading for the West Coast raised the hackles of many Plains 
Indians toward Americans, and Brown felt that open hostility between the United 
States and some western tribes was in the wind. To prevent this, American 
bureaucrats faced two options: either to send a large military force west to protect 
emigrants and subjugate the Indians; or negotiate some agreement with and 
between the tribes. The United States took the latter course in the first half of the 
1850s, but its idealistic nature and inability to tame western hunting grounds doomed 
it to failure. By the end of the decade the United States was drawn into the larger 
web of intertribal relationships and warfare, and bison remained partially protected 
within grassland buffers contested by tribes and whites.^
In 1849, Brown articulated the need for a comprehensive peace treaty that
’ Orlando Brown, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 31 st Cong. 2nd sess, 1849, H. 
exdoc. 5, (serial 570), 937-38.
" Ibid, 942-43.
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included several western tribes and allowed for the unresfrlcted right of passage of 
Americans through the West. In agreeing to this, the signatory tribes were given an 
annuity, by way of agricultural supplies and other goods, as compensation for any 
native fauna emigrants killed or disrupted on their way west. Another federal goal in 
this proposed treaty was the consolidation of tribes, especially smaller bands, which 
were increasingly exposed to attacks by more powerful groups, particularly the 
Blackfeet and Sioux. Consolidation better enabled the government to protect and 
monitor tribes, it believed, with the additional bonus of opening up surplus lands to 
be sold to non-Indians. A declining buffalo population and the precarious nature of 
the hunting grounds presumably provided a powerful inducement for smaller tribes 
to seek govemment protection.^
If this was an idealistic bureaucratic approach to Indian problems, it was also a 
cost effective one. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, the western tribes were 
formidable obstacles to American expansion. At the time, the American 
govemment believed a massive military assault to subjugate western tribes was 
impractical, if not impossible. Peace treaties, on the other hand, offered a relatively 
cheap solution. However, such treaties depended on a multitude of factors that had 
to mesh together and somehow follow the plan drawn up by white policy makers.
In most cases, the United States ignored the unique cultural mores of the tribes 
entering into the treaties, while the bureaucratic web was often too thick to carry out 
the treaty provisions efficiently. More importantly, treaties, and the policy makers 
who created them, took a static view of hunting grounds as stationary places rather 
than highly mobile herds of animals responsive to the human and environmental 
forces arrayed against them.
In 1851, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs gave Superintendent David D.
Mitchell the go ahead to make preparations for a peace council at Fort Laramie. The
treaty that came out of this council included the Cheyennes, Arapahos, Mandans,
Gros Ventres, Hidatsas, Assiniboines, Crows, and several bands of the Sioux.
Although representatives of the Blackfeet were not present, the tribe’s territory was
included in the treaty. The primary goal of Fort Laramie was to “maintain good faith 
® Ibid, 945-946, David D. Mitchell, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1849,1069-71.
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and friendship in all their [the tribe’s] mutual intercourse, and to make an effective and 
lasting peace.” The treaty also stipulated that none of these tribes relinquished their 
hunting rights in any of the lands described in the treaty. Ideally, by defining tribal 
boundaries the various signatory tribes would abide by them and cease going to 
war. The granting of annuities was a way to circumvent violent aggression over 
encroachments of one tribe against another. Article 7 of the treaty stated that any 
depredations that occurred would be settled with the offending tribe giving up a 
portion of their annuity payments to the victimized tribe."*
The Fort Laramie treaty was only the first of numerous misplaced steps in the 
federal attempt to bring peace to the West, as it left out a considerable number of 
tribes. In 1853, Secretary of the Interior Robert McClelland described the Native 
American population in the United States as “a formidable number of savages to 
control and direct,” but expressed optimism that negotiations were underway with 
the interior tribes to open up their lands and subdue them. Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs George Manypenny, going further than McClelland, reported in 1853 that to 
pacify and forcibly prevent hostilities among the tribes "would, in all probability, 
involve an amount of expense far exceeding the cost of arrangements that would 
secure peace and tranquility with the various tribes, and at the same time tend to 
promote their domestication and permanent welfare.” The council at Fort Laramie 
reinforced the Indian Bureau's belief that treaties provided an inexpensive solution to 
the problems facing the federal government in westward expansion. That the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs had been moved from the War Department to that of the 
recently formed Department of the Interior in 1849 only gave the former an added 
incentive to find a non-military solution.^
In his 1853 report, Commissioner Manypenny encouraged that 
superintendents be sent out to the various unsettled regions of the West to rein in
John C. Ewers, The Blackfeet: Raiders on the Northwestern Plains, (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1958), 206; Orlando Brown, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 31 st 
cong., 2nd sess., 1850, H. exdoc. 1, (serial 595), 36-37; the text of the treaty found in Charles J. 
Kappler, ed. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D C., 1904) volume 2, 594-595.
 ̂ Robert McClelland, Annual Report of the Secretary of Interior, 33rd Cong. 1st sess., 1853, H. 
exdoc. 1, (serial 710), 60; , 245, 253, 260.
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tribes outside the boundaries of American control and to negotiate “such 
conventional and other arrangements as may be required to place them upon a safe, 
stable, and satisfactory footing.” For the northern territorial rim of the United States, 
Isaac Ingalls Stevens was the man for the job. Having been recently appointed 
governor of Washington Territory, Stevens was also its ex-officio superintendent of 
Indian Affairs. In 1853, as Stevens circuitously journeyed to Washington Territory 
while conducting a railroad survey, he meticulously followed Commissioner 
Manypenny’s advice to record relevant information about the tribes he made contact 
with and begin the process of establishing peaceful relations between them.®
Arriving in Olympia late in 1853, Stevens began the diplomatic process of 
bridging the gaps present in the Fort Laramie Treaty. Despite requesting several of 
the tribes he had met on his journey west to ready themselves for peace councils in 
the coming spring and summer, the young governor lost a year before he could 
disentangle himself from other bureaucratic duties to begin his peace mission. 
Although he conducted peace councils with tribes around Puget Sound as early as 
December of 1854, it was the three peace councils held the following year farther 
east, that are relevant to the Northern Plains.^
In structure, the Walla Walla, Flathead, and Blackfeet councils, and the treaties 
that came out of them, were quite similar. In a letter to Stevens and superintendent 
Palmer of Oregon Territory, Commissioner Manypenny told the men that “[t]he 
principle objects to be attained by the negotiations and presents are...the 
establishment of well defined and permanent relations of amity with all the most 
numerous and warlike tribes in that remote region of country, both between the 
Indians and the United States, and between ttie tribes as among themselves.” Like 
Laramie, the treaties Stevens and party were to negotiate were primarily treaties of
® George Manypenny, Annual Report of tiie Office of Indian Affairs, 33rd Cong. 1st sess., 1853, 
H. exdoc. 1, (serial 710), 260-61; 461.
 ̂Perhaps the most thorough examination of Stevens’ life is found in Kent Richards, Isaac I. 
Stevens: Young Man in a Hurry (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1979). Of particular 
relevance to this study are the pages 93-240 relating to the railroad survey and peace councils.
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peace.®
Unlike Laramie, the Stevens treaties created a hunting commons carved out
of lands originally designated as Blackfeet territory in the Fort Laramie treaty of 1851.
In the Walla Walla and Flathead councils mention was made of a common hunting
ground east of the Rockies, to be established in the treaty with the Blackfeet. In the
Blackfeet council the longest debates among the tribes -  representatives of the Nez
Perce, Salish, Kootenais, and Pend Oreilles were present -  occurred over the issue
of hunting grounds. Land was important to tribes, but far more so was læid where
buffalo could be found.®
Article three of the Blackfeet treaty stated that the lands lying: 
within lines drawn from the Hell Gate or Medicine Rock Passes in the 
main range of the Rocky Mountains, in an easterly direction to the 
nearest source of the MusdeShell [sic] river, thence to the mouth of 
Twenty-Five Yard Creek, thence up the Yellowstone river to its 
northern source, and thence along the main range of the Rocky 
Mountains...shall be a common hunting ground for ninety-nine years, 
where all the nations, tribes, and bands of Indians, parties to this treaty, 
may enjoy equal and uninterrupted privileges of hunting, fishing, and 
gathering fruit, grazing animals, curing meat and dressing robes.'®
Unlike other tribes, the Blackfeet were given exclusive use of a tract of land 
stretching from the northem border of the commons to the Canadian line -  a 
recognition by the United States of the Blackfeet’s power reminiscent of concessions
made to the Sioux at Laramie. Unfortunately for the success of the treaty, the
® George Manypenny, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th cong., 1st sess., 1855,
H. exdoc. 1, (serial 840), 530; James Doty records the objectives of the councils in his journal, 
see James Doty, Journal of Operations of Governor Isaac Ingalls Stevens of Washington Territory 
in 1855, Edward J. Kowrach, ed. (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1978), 18-19.
® James Doty mentions the “[cjonsiderable anxiety” felt by Governor Stevens at the Walla Walla 
council. See Doty, Journal of Operations , 30; At the Flathead council, proceedings took 
considerably longer than Stevens had planned. In relation to the Blackfeet council, the Flathead 
treaty was secondary to Stevens and he had assumed it would be wrapped up quickly. Such was 
not the case and his impatience at the end of the proceedings was abundantly clear. See Albert 
J. Partoll, ed., “The Flathead Indian Treaty Council of 1855,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 29 (July 
1938), 283-314. This has been reprinted, along with a number of other documents relating to 
the Hell Gate treaty of 1855, by Robert Bigart and Clarence Woodcock, eds., in In the Name of the 
Salish & Kootenai Nation: The 1855 Hell Gate Treaty and the Origin of the Flathead Indian 
Reservation (Pablo: Salish Kootenai College Press, 1996), 19-65. For the Blackfeet treaty of 
1855 see Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties, Vol. 2, 736-39; see also Kent Richards, 
Young Man in a Hurry , 220-21, 227-230. Robert Ignatious Burns also addresses Stevens’ 
impatience at the councils preceding the Blackfeet negotiations inThe Jesuits and the Indian 
Wars of the Northwest, 79-81, 101-107.
Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties, Vol. 2, 736-37.
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favoritism of one tribe over the rest angered the delegates of many of the tribes 
present at the negotiations. Also, the treaties -  at least from the native perspective 
-  were meant only to make the lives of the tribes easier and safer by ending 
warfare. A restricted hunting ground seemed like a reduction of freedom and a step 
backward to some Indians present at the council. Buffalo and other animals did not 
pay attention to Anglo-defined boundaries and the treaty makers failed to address 
what tribes should do when no bison could be found on the grasslands of the 
hunting commons. More than a few Indians at the council recognized this and voiced 
their concern.’"
A chief critic of the proposal was Alexander, a chief of the Pend Oreilles.
Alexander felt the proposed commons too small and that the lands to be reserved
exclusively for the Blackfeet had long been lands his people had hunted on:
We Indians were all well pleased when we came together here in 
friendship. Now you point us out a little piece of land to hunt our game 
on. When we were enemies, I always crossed over there, and why 
should I not now, when we are friends? Now I have two hearts about 
it-why cannot I go there? What is the reason? Why do you point us 
out a small place?’^
In the same vein, Big Canoe, another prominent Rend Oreilles chief, stated in 
reference to the reserved Blackfeet lands, “I had a mind to go there.”’®
Little Dog, a Piegan, responded to the criticisms of the Pend Oreilles: “We 
are friendly. But the North Blackfeet are bad, it might produce a quarrel if you hunted 
near them. Do not put yourselves in their way.” This is an interesting comment. For 
one, it demonstrated that not all bands of the Blackfeet were present at the council. 
The “North Blackfeet” Little Dog referred to were those living beyond the 49th 
parallel in Canada, who journeyed south to hunt. How was the United States to 
control these Indians?’'’
Competition intensified during the 1850s over a declining bison population
” Ibid, 8.
Albert J. Partoll, ed., “The Blackfoot Indian Peace Council; A Document of the official 
Proceedings of the treaty between the Blackfoot nation and other Indians and the United States, 
in October, 855", Frontier and Midland: a Magazine of the Northwest, XVII (Spring 1937), 7.
Ibid. 8.
"  Ibid, 7.
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and other Plains resources, and the threads of peace treaties negotiated in the first 
half of the decade began to fray. Just a year after the Blackfeet treaty, Alfred 
Vaughn mentioned that the Assiniboine were forced by the Sioux from the lands 
“south of the Missouri, and along the Yellowstone” and that the area had become 
(once again) a “debatable ground.” The tenuous peace in the interior west continued 
to erode, and by 1858 A. M. Robinson, superintendent of Indian Affairs for the 
Central Agency, reported that many tribes falling under his jurisdiction were showing 
a “degree of unrest” arising from want of “necessary subsistenœ.” That same year 
A. H. Redfield, superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Upper Missouri, recorded in 
rather stronger terms that the tribes of the Northern and Central Plains “almost entirely 
disregard their treaty obligations, are involved in continual predatory wars upon each 
other and that, indeed, they frequently steal from and rob, and not infrequently k ill, 
white people also [italics in originals].” Hunger more than hatred was driving tribes to 
war. And the bison they were after continued to range in buffers between the tribes, 
and a growing number of Americans, inadvertently promoting the clashes that 
protected them.’^
As the 1850s drew to a close, it was clear that the Laramie and Stevens 
treaties were not keeping the peace, and many bureaucrats began to question the 
entire rationale behind them. At the beginning of the decade the United States was 
still uncertain of its strength and ability to push west. Many bureaucrats believed that 
a number of interior tribes remained “wild” and too powerful to defeat militarily. Yet 
Americans were eager to expand into an area stretching from the Cascade 
mountains to the Mississippi river. This promoted a boon in federal treaty making 
early in the decade centered on the premise of ending intertribal bloodshed, 
consolidating tribes, negotiating land concessions, and defining tribal hunting grounds 
-  all revolving around a system of annuities and common goodwill to keep the whole 
process together.
This idealistic approach simply did not work. Buffalo paid no attention to
Alfred Vaughn, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th cong., 3rd sess., 1856, H. 
exdoc. 1, (serial 893), 635; A. M. Robinson, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 35th 
Cong. 2nd sess., 1858, H. exdoc. 2, (serial 997), 428; Ibid, A. H. Redfield, Annual Report of the 
Office of Indian Affairs, 1858, 442.
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hunting ground boundaries imposed by white bureaucrats. They traveled to the 
richest grasslands where they would face the least human harassment, in buffer 
zones of the Upper Missouri drainage lying between warring tribes and, 
increasingly, Americans. Coupled with other human and environmental pressures, 
the constant requirements of subsistence and a market driven fur trade were paring 
down bison numbers across the Plains, increasing the friction between tribes, as well 
as between Indians and Americans. By the time the Civil War broke out in 1861, 
failed American peace efforts on the Northern Plains had created a brush pile of 
tension needing only a spark to set the region ablaze in violence. The Sioux 
provided it.
While the blood of the North and South was being spilled on Civil War 
battlefields, the Sioux were drawing the United States into the intertribal fray 
American diplomacy had tried to quell. Tensions, however, between the Sioux and 
the United States had begun much earlier. In an 1823 expedition. Colonel Henry 
Leavenworth journeyed up the Missouri river to punish a band of Arikaras who had 
overcome a trading party of William Ashley’s earlier in the year. Leavenworth was 
joined by 1,500 Sioux warriors, and although the party destroyed an Arikara village, 
most of the fleeing tribe escaped. Leavenworth’s failure to pursue disgusted the 
Sioux and seriously reduced the tribe’s estimation of the American military for years 
to come. Joshua Pilcher, the Indian agent for the upper Missouri, was even more 
disgusted with Leavenworth than the Sioux. In a letter to the Colonel, Pilcher wrote, 
“[y]ou came to restore peace and tranquility to the country, and to leave an 
impression which would insure its continuance. Your operations have been such as 
to produce the greatest possible contempt for the American character.”'®
By the 1830s, the Sioux were exerting considerable pressure on Upper 
Missouri hunting grounds. The smallpox epidemic of 1837-1838, so devastating to 
other tribes, only helped the relative strength of the Sioux. In the Fort Laramie 
Treaty of 1851, it was the Sioux who received the largest portion of western lands
Richard White, "Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries," Journal of American History 65 (Sept. 1978), 332-22; Chittenden, 
The American Fur Trade of the Far West, Vol. 2, 600.
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as their domain. As historian Richard White has explained, Fort Laramie sanctioned 
the Sioux right of conquest, and acknowledged them as the most powerful tribe on 
the plains. By the mid-1850s the Sioux became the primary competitor to 
American dominance over much of the West and, with their Cheyenne and Arapaho 
allies, were a force to be reckoned with. Sioux aggressions quickly splintered gains 
made by the mid-century peace treaties.
The reports of various agents of the Central and Northern superintendencies 
of Indian Affairs for much of the 1850s are laced with references to Sioux 
depredations and the tribe’s failure to live up to the treaty stipulations of Laramie. In 
his 1855 report, Alfred Vaughn concluded that the Sioux were seriously threatening 
the peace. That same year, at about the time Stevens was negotiating with the 
Blackfeet and ottier northem tribes at the Judith, General William S. Harney was 
scouring the Plains in an expedition against bands of dissident Sioux. Harney, later 
called “the Butcher” by Indians and some whites, did manage to destroy an 
encampment of Lakotas belonging to a young Sioux named Crazy Horse. The 
letter’s hatred of the United States would later be brought to bare in several 
successful engagements against the American military. But Harney’s sojourn was an 
exception to the weak American military presence in the region, not the rule. In the 
1850s, and for a decade and a half afterward, the Sioux had a free hand to grasp 
what they could from other Northem and Central plains tribes, forcing the latter to 
make new alliances with each other and, more significantly, with the United States 
government.'®
Of all the Sioux, the western Lakotas were the most assertive in their pursuit 
of new hunting grounds and the defense of those they had conquered. For almost a 
quarter of a century, beginning in the early 1850s, the Lakotas vied with the 
Americans as the major power brokers on the Northern Plains. This was made 
amply clear to Lieutenant Gouverneur K. Warren on his exploratory expedition up
.White, “Winning of the West,” 340.
Alfred Vaughn, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 34th cong., 1st sess., 1855, H. 
exdoc. 1, (serial 840), 394; Thomas S. Twiss, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1855, 
404; Donald E. Worcester, “Treaties with the Teton Sioux,” \nForked Tongues and Broken 
Treaties, Donald Worcester, ed.. (Caldwell: Caxton Printers), 224-226.
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the Little Missouri river in 1857. Warren and his men were stopped in their tracks by 
a large party of Sioux before they could enter lush bottom lands covered with 
grazing bison. Bear’s Rib, a Lakota chief, refused to let the white men pass. He did 
not want the buffalo disturbed, nor the country they grazed examined by white 
eyes. Bear’s Rib shrewdly pointed out that “passing through their [Lakota] country 
would give us [Warren’s party] a knowledge of its character and the proper way to 
traverse it in the the event of another war between themselves and the troops ” 
Warren “was necessarily compelled to admit to...the truth and force of these 
objections.”
Unlike other tribes, the Lakotas had chosen to keep their ties to the American 
government minimal. Annuities meant little to the tribe when they had bison robes 
to trade. Bear’s Rib made this point in telling Warren, “that if presents were sent to 
induce them not to go to war with the Crows and their other enemies they did not 
wish them. War with them was a necessity...the annuities scarcely paid for going 
after them; and that if they were not distributed to them while they were on their visit 
to the trading-posts...to dispose of their robes, they did not want them. ”̂ ^
Unlike other, smaller, tribes who thought that abiding by treaties might 
increase their access to buffalo, the Sioux could better exploit hunting grounds 
through force. This was a reasonable assumption being that tiiey were larger and 
stronger than any other tribe on the plains by the time of Warren’s run in with them. 
To a large extent this was because the Sioux had undergone the least depletion of 
their population to tiiat point, managing to side step much of tiie disease that had so 
devastated other tribes. Warren put the combined bands of Sioux, occupying an 
expanse stretching t>etween the Mississippi and the Powder rivers, at a population 
of just below 29,000. If anything, Warren felt the Sioux population actually seemed 
to be growing.^
The increasing tiireat of the Sioux by the mid-nineteenth century is reflected in 
the complaints of other tribes to Indian agents across the Plains. Long Hair, a Gros
Gouverneur K. Warren. Preliminary Report of Explorations in Nebraska and Dakota in the Years 
1855-56-57  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875) 19-20.
Ibid, 47-49.
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Ventre, made clear his disdain of Sioux expansion in a speech to Indian agent A. H. 
Redfield:
My father, since my nation made the Platte treaty [Fort Laramie] I and 
my people have done nothing wrong; but our enemies, disregarding 
that treaty, have made war upon us here ..[w]hat can I do my 
father?...my country extends from Hart river around to the mouth of the 
Yellow-stone, and yet I cannot send my young men just across the 
river here to kill a buffalo, if I see one, without their being attacked and 
killed. This country is not the Sioux country. Why do they not stay at 
home and let us alone?...[t]he Sioux seem to wish to be the strongest 
and most powerful people on the earth, and nothing else would seem 
to satisfy them.̂ ^
Long Hair asks a good question, why did the Sioux not stay “home”? Apart 
from a sizable and perhaps growing population, the Sioux were expanding 
because the buffalo were not. In 1849, Indian agent John M. Richardson predicted 
that the buffalo were growing scarce and that the day was coming when the “Indian 
race will terminate itself in an unnatural war and strive to satisfy the demands of 
hunger over the last remaining buffalo steak that can be found.”^ There is some truth 
to this exaggerated comment. The peace treaties of Laramie and those negotiated 
by Stevens sought to regulate the hunting grounds by drawing imaginary lines 
around them and hoping tribes would abide by the boundaries. The treaties stuck 
only so long as tribes could feed themselves, and even then not all that well. As 
bison populations declined, many tribes -  living both east and west of the Rockies 
-  continued to pursue the dwindling herds, crossing imaginary lines on a map and 
clashing with the reality of one another’s desire to maintain a bison hunting lifestyle in 
a rapidly changing world of white expansion.
In August of 1862, a number of Sioux left their eastern home for a reason 
other than buffalo: there was an uprising of Santee Sioux in Minnesota. Although 
violence was put down quickly, some of the Sioux involved fled to their western 
relatives. The uprising increased not only the population, but the general animosity
A. H. Redfield, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 35th cong., 1st sess., 1867, H. 
exdoc. 2. (serial 942), 427-28.
“ John M. Richardson, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 31st cong., 1 st sess., 1849, 
H. exdoc. 5, (serial 570). For an overview of the changing military patterns of plains tribes, and 
their relation to hunting and the fur trade see Frank Raymond Secoy’s classic work. Changing 
Military Patterns of the Great Plains Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953).
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of western Sioux bands toward whites and other tribes. In 1863 and 1865 two
army expeditions moved up the Missouri looking for hostile Teton and Santee
Sioux who fled after the Minnesota uprising. The expeditions met with little success,
but did afford the Mandans, Hidatsas and Arikaras a brief period of protection.^
However unsuccessful at apprehending the renegade Sioux, the growing
American military presence on the Upper Missouri was significant. With the Sioux
becoming a primary threat to American interests on the western plains, the United
States moved from its peace maker role of the 1850s to become entangled in the
larger web of intertribal relationships and warfare. Some tribes were quick to take
advantage of this new situation.
The Poncas offer one Central Plains example. In May of 1862 the tribe had
not hunted in over a year due to fears of Sioux attack. In the words of Indian agent J.
B. Hoffman, The Poncas were “destitute.” To avoid starving the tribe finally decided
to risk a two week hunt. On only their second day out the hunting party, four hundred
strong, were attacked and turned back by Brule Sioux. Wanting to make another
attempt the Poncas asked their agent for an armed escort of American soldiers. The
request was granted:
On the 5th day out...they discovered a war party of Brules...and these 
Brules came in to camp and had a talk. They told the captain that the 
country where they were belonged to them, and that the whites and 
treaty Indians had no right to hunt or travel there. That they had 
determined to kill or drive away all who came, but that for this time they 
would let them off...and they desired him to carry their warning to the 
Great Father...^
The Poncas and their army escort heeded the warning and turned around empty 
handed. Although the hunt was a failure, the fact the United States military was being 
used to protect it in the first place is interesting. Far from being a benevolent arbiter 
of indigenous disputes, America was firmly entrenching itself in intertribal politics and 
conflict. By choosing sides in intertribal disputes the United States was not only
^McGinnis, Counting Coup and Cutting Horses, 101-103. See also Robert Utley, The Indian 
Frontier of the American West 1846-1890 (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1984) 
76-81 ; McGinnis, Counting Coup and Cutting Horses, 102. See also White, Lewis Henry Morgan, 
152.
J. B. Hoffman, Annual Report of the Office of Indian Affairs, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862-1863, 
H. exdoc. I, (Serial 1157).
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facilitating its own expansionary agenda, but also the access of less powerful tribes 
to bison.
The Sioux found themselves facing American troops, this time led by 
General Patrick Edward Connor, again in 1865. Connor’s troops were trying to keep 
open the Bozeman Trail to mines in Montana Territory open. This sparked the 
beginning of a decade and a half of warfare between the Sioux and the American 
army -  a war waged by the Sioux less over land than over the buffalo that could be 
found on it. At this point, the Lakotas were living in the buffalo-rich Powder River 
country west of the Black Hills. The famed war leader Red Cloud vowed that the 
Sioux would fight to close the road passing through what was perhaps the best 
hunting grounds of the Northern Plains. Beginning with the Fetterman massacre in 
December of 1866, warfare between Red Cloud’s Sioux and the American army 
continued for two years, with a brief respite after the signing of the Treaty of Fort 
Laramie in 1868. This was a treaty that the Montana pioneer and historian Granville 
Stuart called "the most atrocious of them all. ” Elaborating, Stuart wrote that the 
“Sioux were not being driven from their homes or ceding large tracts of territory to 
the whites, they were themselves interlopers...who had been driven out of 
Minnesota in 1863 for the atrocities committed by them on the whites.”^ 
Nevertheless, Red Cloud and the Sioux had kept the Bozeman Trail, and the 
hunting grounds it penetrated, closed.*
By the time of the second Fort Laramie Treaty, the lands of the Upper 
Missouri and Yellowstone drainages were the most plentiful, and contested, hunting 
grounds on the Plains. Granville Stuart commented in his memoirs that “as the 
Indians were driven north and west so were the buffalo and other large game and 
this section of country (eastern Montana) became a veritable Indian paradise. ”̂  The 
success of the Sioux in defending the Powder river country that they themselves 
invaded kept the encroaching v\^ites out. Having stood their ground successfully 
against the federal government, the Sioux increased their pressure on the large
“  Granville Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier. Vol.2, 74-75.
Utley, The Indian Frontier for the American West 1846-1890, 100-110, 120-123. 
Granville Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier, Vol. 2, 60.
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bison herds lying between them and their Crow and Blackfeet neighbors to the west 
-  an area that was “disputed...from time immemorial...”^
Unfortunately, lands outside such buffer zones were becoming sparse. In 
part this was because in the 1860’s western white migration was picking up steam -  
literally. The Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads met at Promontory Summit, 
Utah, in 1869, while the Southern Pacific, Santa Fe, Northern Pacific, and Great 
Northem railroads launched parallel lines to the north and south. The railroads spurred 
American settlement, and intensified the fur trade, allowing a far greater number of 
buffalo robes to be transported quickly from West to East.^
The 1870s saw the buffalo range fast constricting around the lands between 
the Little Missouri and Yellowstone, and the Musselshell river and Judith Basin. That 
these havens provided forage enough for substantial ungulate populations is clear. 
The Crow claimed this region not only for the bison it supported, but also for 
keeping frieir horses. Louis Farnham described the Yellowstone region as “well 
watered, timbered, and capable of yielding an abundant reward to the 
husbandman.”^  Perhaps one of the best assessments of the region is that of a 
survey, conducted in 1874 by special Indian agent F.D. Pease and Army Lieutenant 
G. C. Doane, of the Judith Basin as a potential site for a new Crow agency.
After recording several violent episodes reflecting the turbulent nature of the 
region, Doane described it as “a first class Buffalo range. They may be found in 
some portion of the Valley or adjacent Badlands, all the year round. Elk are 
numerous on the ranges, deer along the Streams, and Mountain Sheep on the 
Summits of the Peaks.” Referring to cattle kept at the trading post, Doane 
mentioned that even left in open pastures “fat beef can be killed” at any time of the 
winter, TTiat the area was quickly becoming the primary hunting grounds, and point 
of conflict, of the Northern Plains is seen in the Crow complaints that “Ftatheads, Nez 
Perces, Bannacks and Snakes all come here, passing through the Settlements on
“  Granville Stuart. Forty Years on the Frontier Vol. 2, 95.
® See Merrill G. Burlingame, “The Buffalo in Trade and Commerce,” North Dakota Historical 
Quarterly 3 (July, 1929), 262-291; Hornaday, “Extermination of the American Bison,” 492-96.
“  For abundance of Crow horses see Thwaites, Travels in the Interior of Norm America, 352-53; 
Thwaites, Travels in the Great Western Prairies, 264.
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their way, coming and returning...horses are stolen, and men are killed, both Indians
and whites; in quarrels almost every trip.”®’
Referring to the nearby junction of the Musselshell with the Missouri, Doane
described it as the primary hunting ground of Upper Missouri Indians, “and the very
heart of the present Buffalo Range.” Going further, Doane wrote:
This District has not been the residing place of any particular tribe of 
Indians, for many Years, but has been held in common hunting ground, 
for all neighboring tribes, being frequented by parties of Sioux, Rees, 
Santees, Mandans, Assineboines, Gros Ventres, Piegans, Pen 
D’Orielles, Flatheads, Mountains and River Crows, Bannacks, Snakes 
and Nez Perces; for purposes of hunting and war. No large tribe has 
taken decided possession of it for their country, and a weak one could 
not hold it.®®
Blackfoot, a Crow Chief, affirmed the value of the Yellowstone lands, and its
highly embattled nature, in a speech made in 1873:
...We have gone to Judith Basin a great deal, and you wish us to take 
it for a reservation. All kinds of men go there; trappers and hunters go 
there poisoning game. The Sioux Indians, Crees, Santees, Mandans, 
Assineboines, Gros Ventres, Piegans, Pen d Oreilles, Flatheads, the 
Mountains Crows, the River Crows, Bannacks, Snakes, and Nez Perc 
Indians and white people, all go there. You wish us to take the Judith 
Basin for a reservation. All these Indians will come, and we will likely 
quarrel . Judith Basin is a small basin; a great many people go there; 
we all go there to eat buffalo. I have told you about the Sioux when 
they come to fight us...You think you have peace with the Sioux; I do 
not think you have.®®
Blackfoot recognized clearly that the Judith Basin was a no-man’s land and, in his 
reluctance to have his tribe’s reservation placed there, acknowledged how 
dangerous such a place was. Blackfoot also gave an insightful appraisal of the 
relationship between the United States and the Sioux -  a relationship that continued 
to have an important impact on other Plains tribes and the bison they hunted.
By the time of Blackfoot’s comment, the Sioux represented the greatest
United States Interior Department, Office of Indian Affairs Report (1873-1874), Small Collection 
889, Helena; Montana State Historical Society Arcfiives, 23-26.
Ibid, 15-16, (emphasis added).
® W. 0 . Vanderwerth, Indian Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 193-200. A detailed history of the Yellowstone Basin can 
be found in Mark Brown, The Plainsmen of the Yellowstone (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1961).
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threat to American hegemony on the Plains.^ Prior to Connor’s campaign of 1865, 
violence on the Upper Missouri was predominantly intertribal. Aftenwards the 
situation changed markedly as the United States became more at odds with the 
Sioux and drawn ever deeper into the intertribal politics of the hunting grounds. With 
George Armstrong Custer’s Black Hills expedition in 1874 the situation on the 
Northern Plains quickly deteriorated. During the winter of 1875 runners were sent to 
the camps of the Sioux and their allies with the message that all must report to their 
agencies. The message was ignored, and the stage was set for the the Battle of 
Little Bighorn.®®
Certainly the most famous fight between whites and Indians in American 
history, the Little Bighorn has been the subject of about as many books as there 
were bullets fired at the battle, and need not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that 
Custer’s defeat seriously impacted the human dynamics of the Northern Plains.
After the battle, the hostile Sioux, Arapahos, and Northern Cheyennes were now on 
the most wanted list of nearly every American soldier and politician. Other Upper 
Missouri tribes, aware of the benefits of the American/Sioux animosity, continued to 
help the United States and maintain their access to key hunting grounds. Tribes like 
the Crow and Pawnee contributed scouts to assist the U.S. army in the ensuing five 
years of rounding up renegade Sioux and, with the famed flight of Chief Joseph in 
1877, the Nez Perce.®®
In late December, 1876, through to the spring of 1877, Oscar Brackett 
roamed the Yellowstone country. A typical frontiersman of ttie time. Bracket had 
manned a pony express station in the midst of Indian country, mined in the Black 
Hills until the Custer battle, hauled freight across the D ^o ta  territory, worked for the
^ White argues this convincingly. See White. “Winning of the West.”
See Utley, The Indian Frontier, 180-87; for the personal accounts of fighting, derived from 
pictographs, at the Little Big Horn, and descriptions of exploits in intertribal warfare, by the Sioux 
chief White Bull see James H. Howard, ed., The Warrior Who Killed Custer: The Personal 
Narrative of Chief Joseph White Bull (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968), 1-82; For a 
detailed account of the period and of Red Cloud see James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux 
Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 1-96.
^Thomas Laforge, having spent years among the Crow as a scout and hunter, offers a rich 
anecdotal account of the period and of the Crow . See Thomas B. Marquis, ed.. Memoirs of a 
White Crow Indian (New York: The Century Co., 1928), 31-252.
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Northern Pacific railroad, and had done just about anything else he could do to make 
a buck. “We was going to make our fortune poisning [sic] Wolves,” and hunting 
buffalo, he writes of his reasoning for entering the turbulent lands drained by the 
Yellowstone river. Buffalo were plentiful and hostile Indians still posed a very real 
threat. Wintering on the Yellowstone, upriver from Miles City, Montana, Bracket built 
a hunting cabin to see him through to spring. Throughout that winter buffalo were a 
constant sight:
...the morning after we had got our cabbain done it had turned very 
cold. I went out so I could see up & down the bottoms & the Buffaloo 
was comming down from the Bluffes by the hundreds & the Bottoms 
was covered with them & from that time untill Spring the Country was 
full of Buffaloo.®^
That spring, Brackett floated his hides down to Miles City and then headed 
down the Yellowstone to trap. He didn’t see a soul for two months. The first people 
he did see were Soldiers of the 7th Calvary. The U.S. army was beginning to 
assert its control and the next few years would see almost all northern tribes forcibly 
settled on reservations. The region was still in turmoil, however, in 1878 when 
Brackett lived for a brief time in a mail route station 40 miles into “Indian Country.” 
Spending the next year hunting for the stage line, Brackett recorded that buffalo 
remained in great numbers. “  He was hunting in one of the last refuges for the 
buffalo. The Canadian Mountie Sir Cecil Denny wrote that by 1879, The main herd 
of buffalo now remaining were surrounded by most of the southern Indians together 
with those of Canada, in a section of country south from Milk River to the Little 
Rockies and the Bear Paw Mountains and across the Missouri River to the Juditii 
Basin...”^
By 1880, the protection afforded buffalo by an Upper Missouri buffer zone 
was almost at an end. Most Sioux were sequestered on reservations and whites 
and their livestock were starting to flood the plains. Still, Sitting Bull and his band
^ Oscar Brackett settled near Ismay, Montana Territory. His 34 page reminiscence describes his 
experiences in the Dakotas and eastern Montana Territory, from 1872-1887. Oscar Brackett, 
"Oscar Brackett Reminiscence,” Unpublished papers, Small Collection 29, Helena: Montana 
State Historical Society Archives, OB3-OB7.
^ Ibid, OB7.
Sir Cecil Denny, The Law Marches M/esf (Toronto: J.M. Dent, 1939), 27-31.
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hovering on the Canada/United States border remained a threat, and other tribes 
continued to raid one another. A contested ground, plentiful in bison, remained on 
the plains surrounding the Musselshell river. Granville Stuart observed on his way 
through the area that there were “[bjuffalo by the thousands in every direction.’"” 
Unfortunately for Stuart the degree of danger matched the still sizable number of 
bison. Crow Indians informed him “that the country between here and Flat Willow 
[creek] is swarming with Sioux in parties from ten to ninety strong.’"" Stuart reported 
that the bison and antelope were “very tame” and that he and his men“[h]ad to run 
out and shake our blankets to frighten the buffalo away” -  suggesting that the animals 
had been little hunted.'^
This was the final battleground over the last of the bison. Stuart saw ample 
evidence of war parties in all directions. In his travels through the Judith Basin he 
passed an encampment of Blackfeet, a band of Red River Metis, and a group of 
Crees who had just killed a number of cattle. In fact, it was this latter group that most 
vexed Stuart, who complained that “[rjoving bands of Canadian Indians continued to 
harass us all winter.’"®
The situation changed rapidly the following year, in 1881, when the railroad 
finally reached Miles City. After the iron tracks were laid the buffalo disappeared as 
quickly as they had on the Southern Plains. In 1882, Brackett killed 700 buffalo, 
killing only cows and “young stuff” most of the winter, switching to Bulls after March 
the following year. He hunted primarily in the region between the Yellowstone and 
Little Missouri rivers, one of the last places the animal could be found. In 1883 
Brackett says he killed 700 more buffalo, and with the quest for hides “everyone 
was killing” bison. The northem hide hunt had reached its nadir. After 1883 the bison 
were all but gone. Brackett bluntly summed up the end of his buffalo career this 
way: ‘This was my last year hunting...in the Spring...! went into the Sheep
Granville Stuart, 125.
Ibid, 123.
Ibid, 125, 131.
Granville Stuart, 148-149.
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Business «44
Oscar Brackett, Small Collection 29, 0 8 7 . Bracket’s comment about hunting cows and “young 
stuff’ suggest that at least some white hunters followed the indigenous practice of selective 
hunting, which is particularly damaging to the reproductive success of a species. For Discussion 
of the demise of the Northern herd, effect of the railroad and shift to hide hunting see 
Burlingame, “The Buffalo in Trade and Commerce,” 282-291.
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Conclusion:
Nineteenth century bison decline did not happen for any one reason, nor did 
it occur along an identical timeline for all regions of the Plains. A host of human arxi 
environmental factors combined to eventually bump bison out of the ecological niche 
the animal had held for millennia. Theirs is a story of both life and death, destruction 
and preservation. In attempting to identify why this was the case, I have explored 
five interrelated factors affecting bison; including the American Fur Company, 
competition from domestic animals, a changing climate and ecology, human disease, 
and warfare.
By the 1830s, market incentives combined with native subsistence needs to 
push Indian hunting outside the bounds of sustainability. But the market was far from 
being the only agent in the diminution of the bison. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Euroamerican settlers spread across the Northern Plains. Non- 
Indians -  primarily fur trappers who adopted native ways and often married native 
wives -  were living in the region before the 1850’s, but they were few and far 
between. Early in the 1860s, the promise of gold drew a much larger wave of 
Anglo immigrants across the plains to the Rockies. For most it was a broken 
promise. Nevertheless, the thousands of settlers who flooded early Montana 
boomtowns like Virginia City placed new constraints on the region’s ecology. Failing 
at striking it rich in the mines, some tumed to merchandizing and ranching as a way to 
make a living. The horses, cattle and sheep that Euroamericans brought with them 
consumed the same grasses that bison depended upon -  limiting the carrying 
capacity of northern grasslands.
But the Indians had horses as well. Indian mounts figured into the destrution 
of northern bison In two ways: by competing for forage and by allowing Indians to 
selectively hunt buffalo throughout the year. Too, the horse allowed woodland and 
horticultural tribes living on tiie periphery of the Plains to take up bison hunting full­
time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, swelling native populations on the 
Plains and dramatically increasing the rate of human predation of buffalo. Horses
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were the Indian’s “catch-22” -  the animal enabled tribes to hunt bison too well.
By the early nineteenth century, native subsistence hunting was probably 
exceeding sustainable limits in the long term. In part, Indian beliefs in the 
supernatural origin of bison precluded any real strategies for conserving the species. 
Dan Flores has pointed out that even into the 1880s many plains tribes believed 
that bison were supernatural in origin. Most indigenous plains cultures had some 
variation of a belief that buffalo annually came to the earth’s surface from 
underground, generally through a cave or lake. Given that bison often wintered in 
river bottoms, it makes sense that an indigenous observer witnessing a mass spring 
exodus of these animals from a canyon, or similar land feature, might think bison 
were being magically produced from below ground. While poetic, this mystical 
perception of bison renewal did not promote Indian conservation of the animal.
Even when buffalo had been annihilated everywhere on the plains, many Indians still 
clung to the belief that the animals were only hiding inside the earth and would return. 
In part, the Ghost Dance movement arose in the decade following the northern hide 
hunt to bring bison back through ritual.’
For as long as tribes hunted buffalo there were times when the animal could 
not be found. One day the plains might be covered by what seemed to be an 
endless blanket of grazing bison, while the next showed not a sign of the animals, 
save their dung and the tom up ground Uiat marked their passing. The historic 
population of bison was so enormous, and their range so vast, it is only reasonable 
that Indians would have had a difficult time seeing their actions as having a negative 
impact on the animals. The feedback loops were simply too large. R. Grace 
Morgan has concluded that “hunter/gatherers were highly perceptive of networks of 
causes and effects and of the operational systemics of particular environments, and 
that this knowledge was important in resource procurement strategies."^ This was
likely true regarding the sedentary and highly observable beaver but not entirely so
’ Flores, Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy, 484-485. For overviews of the Ghost Dance see 
James Mooney, The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890 (Lincoln; University 
of Nebraska Press, 1991); Raymond J. DeMallie, ‘The Lakota Ghost Dance; An Ethnohistorical 
Account,” Pacific Historical Review 51 (November 1982), 385-405.
 ̂R. Grace Morgan, Beaver Ecology Beaver Mythology, Doctoral Dissertation (Edmonton; 
Department of Anthropology, 1991), 7.
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for bison. When historic bison populations were at their largest, tribes still faced
times of famine where they did not see buffalo for weeks or even months. Periods
of scarcity were the unfortunate burden of being committed to a nomadic plains
existence. When bison were teetering on the edge of extinction by the late 1870s,
northem tribes surety knew that they were facing an unusually long period of scarcity.
Nevertheless, they could console themselves with the thought that bison had
always returned, even after long absences.^
Certainly tiiere were Indians who did notice that bison were disappearing and
knew that one day they might be gone entirely. The prominent Crow Chief Plenty
Coups had a vision in his youth that foretold of the destruction of the buffalo and of
the importance of making friends with the whites so that the tribe might keep their
homelands."* But most of these individuals understandably preferred to place
blame on whites or other tribes, rather than on themselves. The 1867 complaint of
the Brule Chief Spotted Tail is typical: “[t]he country in which we live is cut up by the
white men, who drive away all the game. That is the cause of our troubles.”  ̂ Lone
Horn, a Minneconjou Chief, lamented in 1865 that whites were “...fighting my people
and scaring all the game off of my land.”® At least into the 1870s other Northern
Plains tribes tended to make similar complaints, only they often blamed the Sioux
rather than the Americans.^ Unfortunately, the native realization that buffalo were on
the decline did more to promote the destruction of the bison commons than any
attempt to conserve it. So many different cultural groups surrounded the diminishing
northern hunting grounds by the 1860s that an “us or them” mentality prevailed. The
reporter John F. Finerty addressed this in part when he wrote that the Indian allies of
the government “killed the animals in sheer wantonness, and when reproached by
the officers said: ‘better kill buffalo than have him feed the Sioux.”’®
® For periodic bison scarcity see Roe, The North American Buffalo, 543-600.
“ Frank Bergon, ed., “Vision in the Crazy Mountains,” The Wilderness Reader (New York; A 
Mentor Book). 223-229.
 ̂Jeffrey Ostler, “They Regard Their Passing as Wakan’: Interpreting Western Sioux Explanations 
for the Bison’s Decline," Western Historical Quarterly 30  (Winter 1999), 484.
® Quoted in ibid, 484.
 ̂A. H. Redfield, Annual Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 1857, H. 
exdoc. 2, (Serial 942), 428.
® Quoted in Wooster, The h/lilitary and United States Indian Policy, 172.
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At the very least, as Dan Flores points out, “such a conception did not aid the 
tribes in their efforts to work out an ecological balance amid the complexities of the 
nineteenth-century Plains.”® Plains Indians, however, never really had a chance to 
work out the Idnks in their nomadic lifestyle: the cultural tenure of equestrian Plains 
Indian culture was too brief and exposed to a host of other external factors. From 
the moment Indians adopted the horse to hunt bison and accepted Western trade 
goods for the animal’s robe, they were tying themselves to a much larger global 
economic and political web from which ttiey could not escape. ®
One strand of this web was environmental: as the Northem Plains climate 
changed in the mid-nineteenth century, at the dose of the Little Ice Age, so too did 
the ecological relationship of humans and bison. As precipitation dropped and 
periods of drought became common, once lush prairies began to dry up. Grasses 
went on the defensive and sent their nutrients deep into the ground, depriving 
ungulates of vital nourishment. Grass fires and grasshoppers only compounded the 
hardships facing humans and animals on the Plains. Even without the pressures of 
Euroamerican settlement and the Western market, life became increasingly 
precarious on the Plains for both Indians and bison in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.
Still, emphasizing the forces that reduced the viability of bison on the Plains 
can make the animal’s decline seem predetermined. This declinsionist approach 
obscures the complexity of historic human and bison interactions in the West and 
ignores factors that mitigated the decimation of northern buffalo. Northern Plains 
bison were offered some protection from the pressures that threatened their 
existence. Buffer zones lying between warring tribes and non-Indians gave the 
ungulate some degree of refuge in core areas of the Upper Missouri until the early 
1880s. While major Central and Southern Plains tribes made peace with one 
another in the 1840s, such a grand rapproachment never occured on the Northern 
Plains. Although the United States tried to curb intertribal conflict in the 1850s, the 
bloodshed did not end. In fact, America became another participant in the battle
® Flores, “Bison Ecology,” 485.
Ibid., 484; Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo,” 52.
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over northern hunting grounds, facilitating access to bison for some tribes while 
opposing others. Conflict between two expansionary powers -  the United States 
and the Sioux -  who sought to control the region erupted in the 1860s, and kept 
northern hunting grounds in turmoil for twenty years -  making it difficult for any group 
to penetrate the region and finish off the last of the bison.
The American Fur Company's tight grip on the Upper Missouri fur trade also 
kept American settlement at bay before the Civil War. The company actively 
discouraged any reports from the Northem Plains that might attract miners or farmers 
to the region and disrupt the wildlife that drove the trade in animal products. The 
American Fur Company’s monopoly also strangled free-market competition in the 
region. Although the company encouraged Indians to kill buffalo for market, it 
discouraged a more prolific trade in robes by Indians saddled with the low prices the 
company offered for furs.
Epidemic disease, too, curbed human predation of bison. Although 
epidemics ravaged indigenous populations in the West numerous times during the 
last four hundred years, none devastated the Northern Plains as much as the 1837- 
38 smallpox outbreak. As much as half the native population of the Upper Missouri 
died. Although an increase in Indian bison hunting for market followed the epidemic, 
far more bison were spared after smallpox dramatically reduced the populations, 
and therefore subsistence needs, of northern tribes.
Northem bison had still another advantage, particularly over herds to the 
south: less competition from horses. Although northern tribes kept horses and used 
them with devastating effect to hunt and kill bison, southern tribes had far more. To a 
large extent this was a result of latitude and climate. Although the Northern Plains 
were wetter, less prone to drought, and more ideally suited to support bison than 
plains to the south, it was a difficult environment for horses. Northern winters were 
longer and harsher than on the Southern Plains. Subsequently, horses wintering on 
the Northern Plains required far more intensive care by humans to keep them alive. 
On the Southern Plains horses stood a much better chance of making it through the 
winter with less human intervention. Indeed, this is reflected by the two million wild
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mustangs reportedly living on the nineteenth century Southern Plains. These equine 
numbers were not replicated on the Northern Plains, and northern bison were spared 
much of the competition over forage faced by southern herds.
Although it was not discussed, the expansion of railroads into the West also 
worked in favor of northem bison. While the Northern Pacific railroad reached Miles 
City in 1881, the tracks of several railroads were laid further south in the late 1860’s 
and throughout the 1870’s. On the Southern Plains, the penetration of railways, such 
as the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe line, corresponded to an innovation in the 
tanning of hides. "Hiis new tanning process skyrocketed the demand for buffalo 
skins, to be used in manufacturing products as varied as tjelts for machines, and 
leather for carriage seats. The railways offered a fast and efficient means of transport 
for the hide trade. On the Southern and Central plains, the concerted destruction of 
the bison, forever associated with people like Oscar Brackett, was launched in 1871 
and finished by 1874. Northern bison held on for almost a decade longer, in part 
because it took that long for the railroad to fully penetrate the region thanks to a 
struggling economy in the 1870s and the violent efforts of the Sioux and other 
tribes.
Nevertheless, frie edge northern bison had finally dulled. By the early 1880s 
white hide hunters followed the railroad into northern hunting grounds and, with 
astonishing speed, capped off the process of bison decline Ijegun much earlier in 
the century. Fortunately the story did not end there. Over a century later bison are 
alive in significant numbers across North America. While the animal in many places is 
a domesticated shadow of its former self there is hope that more herds will be 
allowed to exist in a less managed state -  in expansive refuges without fences 
where wolves and other predators complete a more ancient and poetic cycle of life 
and death.
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